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Peru has a pluralistic economy, which means the existence of multiple 
and competing organizations characterized by different forms of property. 
An industrial enterprise can participate in any of them; social, state, 
reformed private and fully private.
This thesis is about the reformed private sector which provides for 
worker participation in profits, management and ownership of the company. 
The workers will eventually own 50 per cent of the stock holders equity 
of the company at which they work. The industrial community is the insti­
tution created by the government in all companies with five or more workers 
or with a net profit beyond a certain amount. This institution is self­
managed and it is placed in a private company in order to bring about co­
management .
The author hypothesizes that due to group pressures there has been an 
evolution in the implementation of the law of industrial communities although 
the text of the law has remained unchanged. She demonstrates it through a 
"functional-dialectical" analysis at three moments in time where the three 
great actors, identified as the government, the workers and the original 
owners of capital, come together for a moment of balance. This balance is 
every time lost because of the pressures of one of the groups involved.
The methodology is that of functional analysis but the enphasis is 
on the dysfunctions of the system, from there the word "dialectical"1,those 
occurrences that make for change and evolution.
This study is approached from three perspectives in order to give 
each of the three groups a fair share; their understanding of the industrial 
community and its implementation in each case responds to each group'diffe­
rent socialization, goals and commitments. By the same token the conclusions 
are of three kinds depending on which vantage point we take. They are not 
contradictory with each other, only partial. In order to gain a global un­
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis is about industrial democracy in the Peruvian model of 
"co-management." The Peruvian model of "co-management" is unique as it 
is the only one to include stock ownership by the workers as a group. 
The study of the evolution of "co-management" in Peru is interesting not 
only because of its unusual features but also because more advanced 
countries such as Great Britain and Sweden are considering implementing 
systems similar to the Peruvian model in their industrial economies.(1) 
In Peru the industrial sector is the leading one integrated into the 
modern economy of the country and a common belief is that industrial pro­
gress will bring the country to a faster stage of development.
Peru has a pluralistic economy, which means the existence of multi­
ple, competing organizations, characterized by different forms of pro­
perty. An industrial enterprise can participate in any of them: social, 
state, reformed and fully private. The social property sector may engage 
in any activity not specifically reserved for the state. All basic and 
strategic industrial enterprises are state owned and operated. The pri­
vate sector has been reformed to include the industrial community where 
workers share not only in the profits but also in the management and capi­
tal of a company. The fully private which at the beginning of the reforms 
included only those companies with five or less workers and a gross pro­
fit of one million soles has recently been changed (2) to include all 
small enterprises with a gross annual income of less than a fixed amount
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of soles.(3) They function in the traditional capitalist manner except 
for the profit sharing of 25Z among all employees.
The reformed private sector employs 250,000 people with 3,600 In­
dustrial Communities (4) all over the country. Seventy per cent of both 
the employees and the Industrial Communities are in Lima. All these 
people live in urban areas and may be called industrial proletariats. 
An idea of the size of private companies and the number of workers em­
ployed can be obtained by referring to tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 in 
Chapter V. Tables 1 and 2 give statistics about the proportion of popu­
lation economically active.
My interest in studying the evolution of the implementation of the 
Law of Industrial Communities in Peru, springs from the political and 
economic fact that the Industrial Community; e.i. the Peruvian Model of 
co-management, is basic to the Peruvian concept of self-development. To 
create the new social order the government wants, it is absolutely neces­
sary to change the infrastructure of property ownership so that a social 
democracy of full participation can be attained. The reform of private 
industry is being accomplished through legal measures which are inter­
preted, reinterpreted, obstructed, supported and finally applied by three 
great actors involved in the process: the state, the workers and the ori­
ginal owners of the capital. My approach to understand the process of 
evolution is through selective interviews of official representatives of 
these three groups and then, through content analysis of their organiza­
tions*  pronouncements I attempt to do a "functional-dialectical" analysis 
of the process. My basic objective is to determine what each of the 
three groups understands by the Law of Industrial Communities. Another 
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aim is to see if the implementation of the Law of Industrial Communities 
has changed in practice due to pressures from the groups involved.
The period being analyzed is from July 28, 1970, with the promulga­
tion of General Law of Industries to July 28, 1976, with President Morales 
Bermudez message to the Nation. In his message the President suggested 
new great changes in the revolutionary process. There will also be some 
reference to the New Decree Law of the Private Reformed Sector, still 
being discussed at ministerial level, which will replace the present Law 
for Mercantile Companies.
Specific objectives of this study are:
1) To see how or if the implementation of the Law of Industrial Com­
munities has undergone evolution because of the participating groups  
pressures.
*
2) To define what is the conceptual model that the government pre­
tends to implement and contrast it with reality at different moments in 
time.
3) To show the unanticipated consequences that distort or change the 
implementation of the ideal model.
4) To make a realistic diagnosis of the present situation.
One basic hypothesis is that there have been modifications in the 
implementation of the Law of Industrial Communities (5); that although 
the text of the law remains the same there have been other laws, decrees 
and informal interpretations that have redefined what is being implemented 
today; that there has been a dialectical evolution over the years deter­
mined by important conjunctions, where the three great actors came to­
gether for a moment of balance, only to become unbalanced again by the
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anthithesis created by one of the groups involved. The study is in 
three parts. The First Part includes the Introduction and Chapter}I and 
II, Chapter I contains the description of the "functional-dialectical" 
model and Chapter II, the general theory behind "self-management and 
participation" as seen and implemented in various countries. Both Chap­
ters are interrelated; Chapter I provides the frame work and Chapter II, 
the substance. The industrial organization will be seen as an open sys­
tem where serendipitous findings will direct the final outcome.
In the Second Part, Chapter IV describes the Peruvian model, an ac­
count of the antecedents, the Revolution of 1968, and its ideological 
platform to the present. Chapter III sketches the history of labor parti­
cipation in industry. Finally, Chapter V tells us in abstract the text 
of the Law of Industrial Communities that created the model of "co- 
management" in Peru.
Part III contains the heart of the research. In Chapter VI the 
three great actors are identified with their vested interests and previ­
ous commitments providing an understanding of how each views the imple­
mentation of the Law of Industrial Communities. In Chapter VII the oc­
currence of three important conjunctions - when the Law of Industrial 
Communities was given, when CONACI was formed and when the Law for Small 
Enterprise was promulgated - will exemplify the dialectic play of group 
forces in the redefinition and reimplementation of the original law and 
how disregard for previous commitments makes for unanticipated and some­
times serendipitous consequences turning the process in unexpected, 
anomalous and strategic ways.
CHAPTER I
The Methodology Behind the "Functional-Dialectical" Analysis.
This study is limited to the reformed private sector of Peruvian 
Industry. In order to generalize the concepts, all data has been com­
piled into three large sections representing the three great actors of 
the process: the state, labor and the original owners of the capital. 
The state gives the law its official interpretation through its spokes­
men, the President of the Republic and the Minister of Industry and 
Tourism. The workers are originally represented by workers movements 
and later by CONACI (the national confederation of IC). The original 
owners of the capital have multiple organizations, the most outstanding 
being the National Society of Industries and the Regional Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry.
Definition of Terms:
Those in government are members of the Peruvian Armed Forces and 
they are introduced in Chapter IV where the stage for later developments 
in the industry is set. The workers are all those people who are per­
manently and fully employed in the industry sector, no matter what they 
do (6). Workers are the only ones who can belong to an industrial 
community and a sketch of their history together with that of the tradi­
tional capitalists is described in Chapter III. The industrial workers 
organized themselves in what is known as the National Confederation of 
Industrial Communities (CONACI). However, not all workers identify with 
the goals of CONACI, nor are active in their Industrial Communities.
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Moreover, some feel closer to the interests of the capitalists. The 
capitalists are those owners of capital that is not state owned. In the 
model of co-management they gradually yield up to 50Z of a company’s 
stock to the Industrial Community which purchases it with 15% gross pro­
fit allotted by law.
The industrial community is a new type of organization created by 
law for all industrial enterprises with either six or more workers or with 
a gross profit of more than one million soles (7). I consider this organi­
zation neutral and the stage where the two great actors, workers and cap­
italists struggle with each other to dominate the IC to use it for profit 
and to serve their precommitted goals, while the government defines and 
redefines the raison d’etre of the IC. A detailed description is given 
in Chapter V where the Law of IC is explained.
The data were collected over a period of two summers in Peru. In- 
itally, I just tried to learn what the process was about; then, I 
structured a working hypothesis, and defined the three great actors and 
began interviewing people considered at representative organizations: 
Such as the Ministry of Industries and Tourism (MIT), CONACI, Unions and 
the Chamber of Commerce in Arequipa. At the same time I collected of­
ficial pronouncements from the organizations and from local newspapers. 
To aid my work I visited researchers in self-management at several uni­
versities: Universidad del Pacifico, Universidad Catolica, Escuela 
Superior de Negocios Para Graduados, Universidad Villareal. I also 
visited people studying self-management in Peru at DESCO, (Center for 
Studies and Promotion for Development).
After gathering data the protocol I attempt to follow is that of 
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functional analysis. I call it dialectical because of the emphasis on 
the disfunctions of the system and the unanticipated consequences. The 
focus is on the dynamics of social change through historically developed 
forms. It is seen in three moments in time (when the Law of IC was given 
in 1970, when CONACI was created in 1973, and when the Law of Small Enter­
prises was given in 1976). Each conjunction will be understood as defin­
ing itself from the contradictions, conflicts or antithesis created by 
the pressures of the groups involved.
Robert K. Merton summarized the functional procedure as follows:(8) 
"1) Location of participants in the pattern within the social 
structure—differential participation".
That is, I begin with a description of the individuals and groups in­
volved to discern the social items that will be subjected to functional 
analysis. In Chapter IV I describe the general situation of the coun­
try giving emphasis to the military government who is one of the three 
actors. In Chapter III the other two actors, labor and capital, are in­
troduced through a brief overview of their histories up to the time the 
Law of IC was given. Chapter V describes the items of analysis the 
location of the participants in the pattern.
"2) Consideration of alternative modes of behavior excluded by 
emphasis on the observed pattern (i.e. attention not only to what occurs 
but also to what is neglected by virtue of the existing pattern.)" 
Attention will be given here to those alternative patterns which would 
come up if the present structure had not been imposed. Previous sociali­
zation of the members integrating capital and labor would have led to 
different and logical, for them, outcomes if left alone. The alternative 
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outcomes will be understood when examining in detail the three great 
groups.
I,3) The emotive and cognitive meanings attached by partici­
pants to the pattern."
In order to understand the motives of actors, why conflict was prevalent 
at all times and that disfunctions more than functions determined the 
road of the evolution, attention must be given to previous socialization 
and commitments of the actors, as well as their ideologies. This section 
is the heart of the research and is tackled in the second part of the 
study in Chapter VI where each group is identified by its self-definition 
and how it views and understands the process.
"4) A distinction between the motivations for participating in 
the pattern and the objective behavior involved in the pattern."
Having analyzed the three actors in the process and the meanings attached 
to their behavior, we can now see their motives for conformity or devia­
tion from the prescribed norms. We can assess the psychological "needs" 
served (or not served) by the pattern in the three conjunctions mentioned 
above. The dialectical interplay of the three actors as they tip the 
scale of equilibrium one way or another is interesting to see.
"5) Regularities of behavior not recognized by the participants 
but which are nonetheless associated with the central pattern of 
behavior."
There are regularities in the pattern of behavior that go unnoticed by 
those involved but which have consequences for everyone involved and go 
even beyond the social system under study. The regularities comprise the 
latent functions, and if understood, can enlighten the entire process and 
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aid in determining if the aims of the revolutionary ideology are being 
fulfilled. In the concluding chapter I make some predictions based on 
the conclusions of my studies.
CHAPTER II
The General Theory of "Self-Management and Participation"
The idea that workers should share in the decisions which govern the 
life of the enterprise in which they work found varied expression in the 
teachings of nineteenth century social thinkers; however, only toward 
the end of the First World War did the idea take practical shape with 
the establishment, in various countries, of joint committees or workers*  
councils.
After making progress for some years, the movement for workers*  
participation in management decision-making lost its vigor and dropped 
out of the limelight for more than ten years. The efforts made in cer­
tain countries to induce employers to recognize trade unions, although 
directed toward obtaining for unions the right to share in the handling 
of problems of immediate concern to workers, tended to emphasize the 
clash of interests between workers and employers rather than the desir­
ability of cooperating in the solution of problems arising in the day-to- 
day existence of the enterprise.
During the Second World War and the years immediately following, 
the problem of workers' participation in decision making again rose to 
prominence in the field of industrial relations. Workers' councils or 
committees were being established or re-established in various European 
countries, by legislative action or collective bargaining. In Western 
Germany a system of joint management with dual Boards of Directors was 
introduced in the large mining and steel-making concerns.(2)
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At the present time there is a notable upsurge of interest in 
workers’ participation in management. In the resolution adopted in 
1966 on participation by workers, the International Labour Conference 
observed that: "in various countries with different economic and social 
systems, efforts and experiments are being made to enable the workers to 
take part in the decisions taken in their enterprise, especially when 
these decisions affect their employment and their conditions of life and 
work."(3)
"In several western European countries, this interest has been mani­
fested in various different ways in recent years; for example, by the 
establishment of special committees to analyze certain aspects of this 
problem (in France the Masselin Committee on workers’ participation in 
the enterprise and the Mathey Committee on the workers’ share in self­
financing of enterprises; in Norway, the Aspengren Committee; in the 
Netherlands, the Verdam Committee); by the revision of the national agree­
ments relating to workers’ collaboration in enterprise in Norway and 
Sweden; by a change in the legislation (1966) relating to works commit­
tees in France, and the launching of schemes whereby "the old idea of 
the Divine Right of Employers and of endless demands will be replaced by 
the sharing of all in both profits and responsibilities"; and by the con­
sideration of a system whereby the workers will have the right to parti­
cipate in the management of the National Steel Corporation, in the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In addition to which the 
question of workers’ participation in the enterprise has been on the 
agenda of many congresses, conferences and seminars. Nevertheless, the 
fact remains that in certain countries, along with the growing interest 
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in the idea of workers*  participation, an increasingly definite and 
vigorous opposition from the employers has developed towards at least 
certain forms of participation."(4)
In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and in the Central Euro­
pean countries with a planned economy, workers*  participation is pre­
sented in theory as an essential part of the system of production.(5) 
"The principle of the individual responsibility of managers and of the 
collective participation of workers in the management of socialist public 
enterprises must be applied jointly and in co-ordinated fashion," writes 
the author of a report on economic reforms to the Central Committee of 
the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. A Czechoslovak author stresses 
that "if the workers are really to share in the profits and losses in a 
way which will affect their pay, it would be anti-democratic not to offer 
them the legal means of influencing the decisions taken by the management 
whenever such decisions affect the workers’ future remuneration." In 
Poland, according to the Central Trade Union Council: "The self-manage­
ment of enterprises means giving the staff a greater say in management," 
and "allowing the staff a greater share in supervising the way the enter­
prise is managed."(6) In Yugoslavia, a country which since 1950 has de­
vised an elaborate system for workers’ self-management, participation by 
the workers in solving problem confronting an enterprise is a major 
political objective.
In the United States and Canada, observers of the system of col­
lective bargaining as generally practiced in these countries have em­
phasized the extent to which this system gives rise to workers’ partici­
pation and how democratically it works.
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Workers*  participation in the developing countries is frequently 
depicted as essential if schemes for industrialization are to succeed. 
For example, in the third Indian Five-Year Plan, we read: "As it devel­
ops, workers*  participation may become a highly significant step in the 
adaptation of the private sector to fit into the framework of a social­
ist order. It can serve to bridge the gulf between labor and management, 
create better mutual enterprise and facilitate the adoption, on both sides, 
of an objective approach towards the problems of industry and the workers. 
The success or failure of an enterprise is not the concern of management 
alone. For the peaceful evolution of the economic system on a democratic 
basis, it is essential that workers' participation in management should 
be accepted as a fundamental principle and an urgent need." (Abstracts from 
Paragraphs XIII and XIV, Chapter XV) In Ceylon, the Government has 
workers*  participation as part of its platform, and a committee set up 
to examine the problems arising from settlement of workers*  grievances 
and disputes has included the matter in its agenda. In Mali, the 1963 
Act relating to state enterprises provides that "the trade union authori­
ties in the enterprise shall organize the participation of all workers in 
the management thereof." In Algeria, the United Arab Republic and Syria, 
laws have also been promulgated during the last few years to provide for 
system of workers*  management of workers*  participation on boards of 
directors of enterprises. In Tanzania, a law in 1964 set up workers*  
councils.(7)
While these examples may suffice to show the keen interest at pre­
sent in workers*  participation, they also indicate that "participation" 
tends to mean very different things in different contexts.
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Objectives of Workers*  Participation
The aims pursued by the means of workers*  particiaption in decision­
making, the methods whereby participation is to be achieved in practice, 
and the fields in which participation is feasible vary considerably.
Generally the political and social objectives are presented under 
the label of "industrial democracy". These objectives are based on the 
observation that while, in a democracy, the worker has exactly the same 
political rights as any other citizen, it is paradoxical that the worker 
is not normally entitled to have a say in decisions taken within the 
enterprise in which he works, and which directly affect him in his job 
much more immediately than the exercise of his political rights.
Accordingly, those who wish to give the workers a say in decisions 
and to ensure "industrial democracy" in practice as well as in theory 
often affirm their intention of radically changing the manner of decision­
making with individual enterprises.
The notion of "industrial democracy" is in keeping with a concep­
tion of man and human rights and dignity of which the Universal Declara­
tion of Human Rights (1948) is probably the most widely accepted defini­
tion. "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood."(8)
Sometimes the introduction of "industrial democracy" into individ­
ual enterprises is conceived of as part of a broader objective, namely, 
the transformation of the economy as a whole. In Belgium, for example, 
works councils were introduced by an enactment of a general nature 
"relating to organization of the economy," which also set up joint in­
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dustrial councils and a central economic council. The Basic Programme of 
German Trade Union Federation (1963) emphasizes this aspect very strong­
ly.
In other cases, the social objectives advanced in favor of workers' 
participation are more limited. The advocates of participation may, 
for example claim that such participation is necessary to improve the 
atmosphere in the enterprise, or to encourage better relations between 
management and staff. Less emphasis is placed on the introduction of 
industrial democracy than on the desirability of integrating the worker 
into the enterprise.
Most economic objectives are linked, directly or indirectly, with 
making the enterprise more efficient, and with the contribution the 
worker can make to this end. One significant example of the importance 
attached to economic efficiency and of the recognition of the role which 
workers can play in improving methods of organizing work is the recent 
trend toward "productivity bargaining" in Great Britain.
In Peru the objectives are ethical, to develop the person to his 
full potential and make him more human by removing alienation; social 
and political, to create a social democracy of full participation at all 
levels, and in all areas of human activity; and economic, to harmonize 
capital and labor through co-determination for greater productivity.
Methods of Worker Participation
While in the strictly individual sense, the very fact that a man 
works in a certain enterprise implies that he shares in its activities, 
workers' participation in decision-making within an enterprise is usual­
ly through a collective participation which goes beyond performance of 
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the specific job assigned to each worker.
The methods whereby collective participation is brought about depend 
upon the political, economic, social and cultural conditions in each 
country, and also upon particular aims of the governmental authorities 
(e.g. the Legislative) or political parties when establishing the in­
stitutions or procedures of participation. "Participation can mean em­
ployees, directly or through their representatives, taking some part in 
reaching decisions that affect them. This may include being asked to 
give advice before a decision is taken (i.e. consultation) or being a 
party to a joint management/trade union decision (i.e. negotiation), or, 
in the case of employees serving on Group Boards as part-time Directors, 
sharing responsibility for a management decision." (9)
When there is participation through negotiation and bargaining we may 
say that there is "co-decision," but not "co-management," for the deci­
sions in question relate to specific matters and not to all the problems 
connected with the management of the enterprise. In the theory of in­
dustrial relations there is a tendency to contrast or at least to make a 
distinction between "negotiation," dealing with questions in which 
workers' and employers' interests differ, and "participation," dealing 
with matters of common interest. (10)
A third way in which workers may share in decision-making, is by 
representation in managerial bodies, such as the board of directors for 
a limited liability company. This method is "participation in management," 
properly so called, since the bodies in question have the ultimate respon­
sibility and usually deal with the range of problems which arise in the 
running of an enterprise.
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Sometimes the workers’ representatives in these bodies constitute 
a minority; for example, in a number of nationalized enterprises in 
France, and under the system introduced in the Federal Republic of Ger­
many in 1952, whereby the workers’ representatives are allotted one-third 
of the seats in supervisory councils.
When workers and shareholders are represented on boards in equal num­
bers, the term generally used is "co-determination." An important example 
is that of the big coal mining and steel concerns in the Federal Republic 
of Germany. Under legislation given in 1951 the workers’ representatives, 
the majority of whom are directly appointed by the competent union, occupy 
half the seats in the supervisory council or board concerned, the other 
half being reserved for shareholders, while one independent member (often 
referred to as the "eleventh man"), is elected by the members of the super­
visory council, acts as chairman. Another feature of the system is that 
the managerial team comprises a Director of Labor who can be appointed 
only with the assent of the worker members of the supervisory body. Need­
less to say, in such a system the workers’ participation affects the very 
nature of private enterprise. "...The aim in the final analysis is to 
place on the same footing in the exercise of authority those enjoying the 
rights of ownership, and those whose work has been hired for the purpose 
of operating the enterprise."(11)
Lastly, workers alone may elect the members of the councils called 
upon to manage the enterprise. This is the system of "self-management," 
utilized by the Yugoslavian experiment under way since 1950 which makes 
the workers responsible for the management of public enterprises.
The Peruvian model of co-determination is unique in method because 
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the workers buy stock of the companies and elect their representatives 
to governing board as shareholders, and enjoy the same rights and 
responsibilities as the other shareholders. However, under the Peruvian 
method of co-management, workers through the Industrial Community can 
purchase only up to 50% of a company’s stock. The Peruvian model is 
examined in detail in Chapter V.
Types of Decisions:
Decisions in industrial enterprises fall into three major categories: 
those which relate to technical problems (production, organization and 
working procedures), those which relate to employment and those which re­
late to the economic and financial policy of the enterprise (forecasts 
of the future sales, investments, programmes and so on).
The degree of participation may vary with the kind of decision.
Thus, within one and the same enterprise, there may be a system of joint 
decision making on working conditions by virtue of collective bargaining 
and consultation of the workers regarding the organization of work, while 
upon matters concerning economic policy, participation may mean no more 
than that the workers are kept informed. In parctice, all degrees of 
participation tend to equalize. For example, it has been observed that 
discussions concerned with ways and means of giving workers a bigger 
stake in the enterprise (discussions which initially had a limited ob­
jective of establishing a specific method of remuneration that ensure 
workers had a financial interest in the benefits of increased productiv­
ity) tend to expand very quickly to cover the field of management deci­
sions. (12)
A system of profit-sharing or acquisition of capital (for example, 
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through the destribution of shares) does not, necessarily entail parti­
cipation of workers in decisions, since it may be set up and put into 
operation solely by the initiative of the employers. It may, however, 
include participation in decisions to the extent that its method of 
operation is decided upon after consultation or in agreement with the 
workers’ representatives. Participation very largely depends on individ­
ual attitudes to it. It has been said that: "members of an organization 
sometimes give the impression that they don’t know their own minds in this 
matter. Following a natural desire to mould their own environment as far 
as possible, they are willing to participate, but at the same time they 
are afraid of participating in decision-making in so far as this may en­
tail losing their independence by so doing, or finding themselves bound 
and restricted by their partners in the process. It’s far easier to keep 
one’s independence and integrity by holding aloof than by agreeing to 
share the responsibility for decisions. Hence workers rarely agree to 
share in the decision-taking unless offered a very substantial induce­
ment." (13)
Hence any generalization must necessarily be hazardous. It has, in 
fact, been observed that those who claim to favor reforms leading to a 
greater participation of workers in decisions are increasingly aware of 
the diversity of situations and thus of the need for comparable diversity 
in the systems to be created.
In any case, to be in a position to have an effective voice, either 
on management boards, through joint consultations or bargaining negotia­
tions, workers’ representatives should be able to understand the nature of 
the problems discussed and the effects of the decisions to be taken.
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The wide range of basic concepts governing workers' participation, 
the aims and objections which have been briefly reviewed are reflected in 
the equally wide range of machinery for participation which exists under 
various national schemes or in particular enterprises. These various 
types of machinery differ not only as regards their institutional forms, 
their scope and terms of reference, but also as regards their formal 
powers in regard to the decision-making process within the enterprise. 
They must also be clearly differentiated according to the legal status 
and the extent of the particular enterprise's autonomy within the economy, 
the characteristics of the management as well as the general features of 
the industrial relations system and the role of employers' and workers’ 
organizations of the country or industry concerned. In addition to these 
various factors which are directly linked with the workers' role within 
the enterprises, the system of workers’ participation will in practice be 
strongly influenced by the constitutional and political system governing 
the society at large, by the level of economic, social and of cultural 
development, by the relations existing between the various social groups 
which form the society, by its history, the entrepreneurial motivation 
of the population and other related socio-cultural factors.
Systems of Workers Participation
There are many forms of workers participation in enterprise. Sys­
tems based on workers’ self-management within enterprises represent no 
doubt the most far-reaching attempt at directly involving the workers in 
the decision-making process and in the responsibilities of management. 
While Yugoslavia offers the oldest example of a nation-wide system of 
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workers*  management which has been in operation for a number of years 
in all enterprises throughout a country, similar methods of management 
covering major sectors of the economy have been introduced more recently 
in several other countries, including Poland, Algeria and Peru.
The main features common to these systems are generally the follow­
ing. They are based on general legislation applicable to enterprises 
which belong to the public sector of the economy and in respect of which 
only management rights, and not ownership, have been transferred to 
workers. The workers entitled to participate include all those actually 
engaged in the enterprise, workers and employees alike; no management 
rights are retained by those who, for whatever reason, cease to work in 
the enterprise. The main management function of the workers*  collectiv­
ity are usually exercised through a body elected by the workers and 
generally known as the "workers*  council." The competence of the workers*  
management bodies extends to all decisions taken within the enterprise, 
although special rules of procedure and for supervision may be laid down 
by legislation in order to avoid arbitrary action and to ensure the ob­
servance of certain specific standards. The entrepreneurial motivation 
of the worker-managements is linked with their right to dispose of the 
profits or the net income of the enterprise, or of a part thereof, in­
cluding the allocation of such funds for reinvestment, social and cultur­
al purposes or their direct distribution in the form of extra remuneration.
Another form of system is where workers*  representatives are admitted 
to participate as full members of the collective supervisory or manage­
ment bodies which administer the company, enterprise or undertaking 
where they are employed. These schemes, often referred to as management 
22
participation systems, present a number of distinctive features which 
differentiate them from the workers*  self-management mentioned above.
Workers*  representatives in the various boards represent normally a 
minority of, and in any event not more than half the membership of the 
management bodies. The status of the company or enterprise, public or 
private, remains basically unaltered. There are usually no specific pro­
visions for direct participation by the workers in profits or incomes. 
However, where workers are granted parity of representation on the Board, 
workers*  representatives are expected to influence and to modify in the 
light of the workers*  interests management policies in general, including 
decisions affecting profits and income distribution, their influence 
being intimately blended with that of the other members of the Board, 
through a continuous process of discussion and search for compromise. 
The Board sittings are generally private, publicity being ruled out; hence, 
direct participation of individual workers within the enterprise is gen­
erally not aimed at. Nor are there as a rule specially built in facili­
ties for such wider participation.
Systems of workers*  participation in the governing or supervisory 
boards of the enterprises differ according to whether they apply to a 
whole branch of the economy, including the private sector, or whether 
they only apply to publicly-owned companies.
The co-determination system of joint participation in management 
which prevails in the Federal Republic of Germany - and which provides 
for equal or minority representation of workers in the supervisory boards 
of enterprises, according to the economic branch concerned - is certainly 
one of the most widely known systems of participation in decision making 
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and one of those which have attracted greatest attention both at the 
policy making and research levels within the country as well as abroad. 
Participation in management is applied not at the level of establish­
ment (production units) but at that of the company or industrial concern 
which is a legal body or entity.(14)
General policy guidance and supervision is vested in a supervisory 
board elected by the shareholders*  assembly; the supervisory board in 
turn designates the management board, which usually comprises three full- 
time directors who form a collective top management organ of the company 
and are responsible for all current business matters.(15)
Under the general provisions of the law of 1952, the workers appoint 
one-third of the membership of the supervisory board in all public or 
private companies of a certain importance where such collective organs 
exist or may be brought into existence.(16)
The workers*  representatives are elected by direct and secret ballot 
by all workers and employees of each company; if there are two or more 
seats to be filled, at least two of the workers*  representatives must be­
long to the company’s staff, one at least being a "worker" (wage earner) 
and one a (salaried) "employee." The workers*  representatives are full 
members of the boards, enjoying all rights and emoluments pertaining to 
such office and taking part in all deliberations and decisions. To sum 
up the position, it would appear that the co-determination bodies are 
operating smoothly and regularly, within the framework of the legal pro­
visions recalled above, in practically all the companies concerned. Al­
though the appeal and arbitration procedures have been made use of in a 
limited number of cases, no major breakdown of the new management struc- 
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Cure has been reported. Indeed, it is the common finding that the 
workers1 representatives in most companies have found it possible to 
join quite closely with the other members in the elaboration of policies 
and in the decision making process.
In Austria, two representatives of the workers are elected by the 
workers councils in both public and private companies as full members of 
the statutory boards thereof. The main objection to this type of scheme, 
which is voiced by the workers' side also in other countries, is that the 
majority representing the shareholders may solve major policy problems 
outside the board room, the formal sessions being then reduced to mere 
formality.
Under French legislation two workers*  representatives are entitled 
to participate, in a consultative capacity, in the deliberations of the 
management boards of joint stock companies. Little attention is general­
ly given to this provision the practical impact of which remained quite 
limited.(17)
Limited workers' representation on boards of joint stock and simi­
lar companies has also been provided for under recent legislation of Spain. 
Under this legislation, at least one workers' representative must sit on 
any permanent subcommittee or panel dealing with matters other than rou­
tine business and which may have a direct bearing on workers' interests. 
Decisions of boards of directors which do not duly incorporate the workers' 
representatives are null and void. In the Netherlands the Joint Action 
programme of the three Dutch national trade union centers provides that 
"the composition of the board of directors must reflect the interests both 
of the suppliers of capital and of the workers'*  and that "the workers.
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just as much as the shareholders, must have the right of investigation. 
They must be entitled to exercise this right if they have justified 
doubts as to the efficient management of the enterprise and the smooth 
running of operations."(18)
In the Congo (Kinshasa), the trade unions made in 1965 a vigorous 
claim for their association in management of the major concerns exploit­
ing the country's mineral resources, several leading trade unionists were 
later appointed, in January 1967, as members of the newly formed manage­
ment board of the State Holding Company (Generale Congolaise de Minerals) 
which took over the responsibility for mineral mining and processing in­
dustry. (19)
The appointment of leading trade unionists on the boards of national­
ized or of public industries generally is a well established practice in 
several other countries, including the United Kingdom and Ireland.
In the United Arab Republic, there is parity in the Board of Direc­
tors since 1966 for the public sector. All companies which belong to the 
public sector are administered by an Administrative Council with a maxi­
mum membership of nine (including the chairman), half of which represent 
the workers while the other members as well as the Chairman are appointed 
by the President of the Republic. The workers' members are elected 
directly by the workers in a secret ballot held under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Labor. A workers education institute was recently estab­
lished to provide special training for the worker members of the adminis­
trative councils. In the Syrian Arab Republic, a Decree provides for the 
setting up of a Board of Directors which comprises four representatives 
of the workers, one of the trade union, one of the Executive Committee of 
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the Arab Socialist Resurgence Party (Baas) and two government represen­
tatives, one of whom is the Chairman of the Board and the Managing 
Director of the enterprise. His Deputy, however, who has to counter­
sign all such decisions as may be specified by the Board, has to be 
chosen from among the workers1 representatives. The workers' members of 
the Board are selected by a "workers*  committee" which includes two re­
presentatives of each sector (department) of the enterprise elected di­
rectly by the workers. Decisions which are singled out as being reserved 
to the Board include - subject to the approval of the Minister of Labor - 
the drawing up of the rules of employment, questions of remuneration and 
wage supplements as well as conditions of work.
In Mali, enterprises of the public sector - which include practical­
ly all major enterprises of the country - are placed under the management 
of Boards of Directors of 5 to 11 members including the principal managers 
and members of the trade union committee within the enterprise; the Board 
is assisted in its work by a delegate of the Party. In actual fact, the 
composition of the Boards varies quite considerably as does the scope and 
nature of their activities. Legally, the reserved powers of the Boards 
include all questions relating to the organization of work, productivity 
and remuneration of work, recruitment and lay-offs.(20)
Work councils are the most wide spread and best known forms of as­
sociating workers in the decision-making process within the enterprises, 
with a system related to, but different in principle from the trade union 
organizations.
Generally speaking, the powers of the works councils or committees 
are merely consultative and extend to the three key areas of enterprise 
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management covering economic, personnel and social matters. However, 
while some national systems go scarcely beyond this general consultative 
status (e.g. in Finland and the Netherlands), others reserve to the coun­
cils or committees certain specific functions in respect of which their 
advice or co-operation is mandatory and which tend to associate them more 
closely with the management so that, they may become an indispensable part 
thereof.
The works councils or committees are the bodies which generally 
elect workers’ representatives on the supervisory or management boards of 
joint stock and similar companies in countries where such representation 
is provided for under national legislation.
In a number of countries however, where there are no binding statu­
tory provisions concerning participation in or collaboration with manage­
ment at the enterprise level, labor-management committees have been estab­
lished on voluntary bases in most or at least in a significant number of 
enterprises.
I have dwelt on the model of workers’ participation in the Supervisory 
and Management Boards of enterprises more than on any of the others because 
this is the model that with its unique characteristics will be analyzed in 
the Peruvian Private Industry.
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PART II
THE PERUVIAN MODEL OF CO-MANAGEMENT
In this section I present the three main actors affected by the 
reform of the enterprise and the mechanism of "co-management." This 
corresponds to the first step in the functional analysis. A description 
of "what is." The military, capital and labor have a history, they all 
have been subject to different socializations, their goals in life have 
also been different. The purpose of the next three chapters is to pre­
sent these three groups as they see themselves in order to understand why 
they reacted the way they did when the enterprise was changed. If we 
understand their commitments we shall not be surprised to see them in 
later chapters react creating conflict.
The item of analysis is the mechanism of "co-management" by describ­
ing it and projecting its logical development we shall be able to under­
stand why capital and labor reacted they way they did.
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CHAPTER III
Historical Aspects Leading Towards the Industrial Community.
In order to understand who the people affected by the Law of In­
dustrial Communities are, it is necessary to review the history of capital 
and labor before 1970. 
The Capital
Peru is an underdeveloped country because it is a dominated country (1): 
Spain had colonized the greater part of today's Latin-American countries to­
wards the end of the 16th century. The economic policy of imperial Spain 
was to exploit as much as possible the agricultural and mining resources 
of the colonies. The political power of the crown was placed without re­
serve at the service of the Spanish bourgeoisie resident in the metropolis. 
This merchant bourgeoisie until the end of the 18th century, prevented 
Spain from any kind of industrial development. The colonies, by conse­
quence, were even less in a position to initiate a process of industriali­
zation, since the metropolis blocked the way by its monopolistic policy of 
import-export of raw materials. In Peru during the colonial period a 
group of national pioneers (Criollos) started to form. Its function was 
to serve the Spanish crown in the colonies in exchange for big salaries, 
agricultural consessions and socio-political privileges.
At the end of the 18th century this indigenous bourgeoisie, called 
consular bourgeoisie because of its dependent nature, began to grow con­
scious of its role. It began to question supposed advantages of continu­
ing dependence on the Spanish crown. All American commerical activities
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were monitored by the European metropolital bourgeoisie which imposed 
the prices, forbiding trade with anyone else. At the beginning of the 
19th century the situation became intolerable. The wars of independence 
finally broke out and in 1821 Peru achieved its independence.
Now the Peruvian bourgeoisie was free to sell its products to the 
highest bidder. At that time the highest bidder was England. Through 
various mechanism, the English bourgeoisie, now industrial, came to domin­
ate the Peruvian bourgeoisie and transform it once again into a consular 
bourgeoisie. The situation was the same, only the name of the metropoly 
had changed, and a little national freedom had been won: formal independ­
ence, democracy on paper. During 1920’s the United States initiated a 
policy of neo-imperialism. Capital intensive industries were started dis­
regarding Peru is cheap and abundant in unskilled labor creating the 
phenomonon called marginalization. Traditional economic activities be­
came subordinate to the new, modern sector. All who could modernize 
joined in an "oligo-imperialist” coalition. Until 1968, 80% of the Peru­
vian exports (2) were controlled by six American firms whose policy was 
clear: exploit the natural resources and pay prices fixed by themselves.
During the Second World War imports diminished in Peru, but not 
exports. National industries with foreign capital were started. The 
American companies set the prices, salaries, credits, taxes. Political 
changes originated from this dominance, many foreign enterprises that be­
longed to the ’’enemy" were eliminated (Peru was an ally).
Industry developed faster after the Second World War and especially 
during the Korean War. International markets influenced the direction of 
the Peruvian economy for political as much as economic reasons, prices 
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were raised or dropped, products made, according to their demands in 
world markets without regard to the internal needs of the country.
Approximately a quarter of the manufacturing output of Peru is con­
centrated in processing export products (minerals, sugar, fishmeal) and 
about half is in traditional consumer goods (food processing, textiles, 
etc.); the remaining quarter in basic support industry (steel, cement, 
fertilizers, etc.). A process of import substitution has been under 
way for two decades but this has involved the ’'typical" multinational as­
sembly plants preventing the formation of a true capital goods sector. 
Manufacturing is sharply divided between large capitalist enterprises, which 
account for about two thirds of output, and artisan production, which ac­
counts for about two thirds of the work-force. Industry as a whole is not 
intersectorially integrated, and thus extremely dependent upon imported 
materials and capital goods.(3)
In conclusion the industrial modern sector (capital intensive and low 
in work force) belonged to a few nationals together with foreigners; 40% 
was totally American owned. This highly concentrated ownership of the 
modern sector, and in particular the external dependence of the structure, 
resulted in the outflow of surplus, the alienation of decision-making 
power and the absence of either domestic technology or capital goods in­
dustry. (4)
During the Korean war there was growth in the GNP; however, the dis­
tribution was not equitable. The INP (National Institute of Planifica- 
tion) reports in 1962: "The participation of the private entrepreneur 
between 1950/60 has increased while that of the worker has diminished... 
the gains for the private entrepreneurs have increased 304% while those of 
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the workers have only increased by 191%."(5)
The local entrepreneur and capitalist can be lumped together with 
the foreign investor since he only thinks about benefiting himself and not 
developing the country. Richard Bath and Dilmus D. James advance an inter­
esting thesis that there is no class consciousness of being upper class, or 
elite or ruling class. All those who are on top of the social ladder do 
not interact between themselves but respond to individual foreign inter­
ests (6).
Industrialists are not opposed to foreign investment, nor are they 
particularly linked with any developmental ideology; industrialists are 
neither nationalist nor progressive in their basic orientations, they lack 
a sense of group identification, they are fragmented...the demands they 
make on the political system are normally made through personal contact 
rather than institutional channels. They lack perception of class inter­
ests and feel privileged within their own society, disregarding the fact 
that they are servants of foreign imperialism.(7) The logic development 
of this mentality would be to insist on profits for individual gains as­
suming all the risks and taking responsibility for the consequences. 
Labor (8)
The Peruvian working class movement was organized around the urban 
proletariat of Lima-Callao at the beginning of this century. They devel­
oped as an independent class with an anarchist/syndicalist ideology under 
the leadership of the socialist group headed by Jose Carlos Mariategui. 
During the first three decades of this century the workers*  movement was 
small and vulnerable but very active against the oligo-imperialist state 
of the economy. It had two directions: that of Haya de la Torre that saw 
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it as a popular front centered in the small bourgeoisie, and that of 
Mariategui that insisted on making it representative of the Indians and 
peasants as well.
In this scenairo labor can be defined as a "class" in the Marxist 
sense of people sharing similar relationships to the means of production. 
This definition, however, will become irrelevant once we consider labor 
in the context of the industrial community, because in the law of indus­
trial communities workers are "all persons who work in the industry per­
manently and at full-time."(9) That would mean different incomes, dif­
ferent social statuses, different perceptions of oneself.
In this preview of the state of the working class prior to 1970 we 
shall consider only two classes: workers or the proletariat, and capitalists. 
It would be interesting to note that there have always co-existed groups 
that cannot be categorized as a "class": students, bureaucrats, military, 
peasants, domestic servants, etc. The so called "middle-class" cannot be 
considered a class either. It includes too many separate groups that do 
not share a consciousness. Our study, therefore, is narrowed down to ad­
dress labor in the modern sector of industry and its counterpart, the 
capitalists. In this context the Marxist approach is relevant.
The development of the workers*  movement as a class movement was sud­
denly interrupted by the economic and political crisis of the 1930’s. 
Their main stream socialist orientation was replaced by a populist ideol­
ogy with nationalist and reformist orientations. The working class was 
attracted towards a movement composed of several groups allied to fight 
against the oligarchic and pro-imperialist power of the local bourgeoisie. 
For a while the workers lost their hegemony as a class movement and found 
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some action through the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA)(10) 
party which had to respond to many interests besides those of labor and 
slowly it drifted away from the radical orientation that brought labor to 
its fold. Nevertheless, the workers’ movement identified with APRA during 
the 30* s and AO’s and its history is that of the APRA party. The Commun­
ist party did not present an important alternative at that time. After the 
Second World War APRA slowly lost control of the workers’ movement. The 
populist orientation of the party was polarized into conservative and 
leftist factions, there was turmoil within. Labor became fractured search­
ing for its identity as a class again.
Historical Review
At the end of the 1800’s the penetration of foreign capital in the 
sugar plantations, mines, cotton fields and oil reserves created deep 
changes in the social structure of these places. A new class of land­
owners, traders and intermediaries was created; together with the new 
technicians and professionals they became the new dominant class suppor­
tive of imperialism. Its counterpart, the proletariat was born in Peru. 
It grew out of peasants and Indians leaving their land to work in the large 
agro-industrial concerns as wage earners; they began selling their labor, 
for short periods at a time, to pay their debts in order to remain in­
dependent small land holders. Basically peasants at heart, these people 
had mixed feeling about working for wages for their ideal was to return 
to the land permanently. Those who made the final move to the city still 
wanted to remain independent and their ideal then was to be a truck or bus 
driver, a small merchant.
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The first urban proletariat was formed around Lima-Callao at the 
beginning of this century by workers in the reduced manufacturing sector 
and in services. They were joined by the displaced people from the tradi­
tional sector. As many activities became obsolete, artisans changed their 
activities, some sold their labor, others became small bosses. Workers 
began to organize around syndicalist/anarchist ideologies. These were 
the seeds of the future Peruvian labor movement. These people did not 
look back at the agrarian society as their reference group but at the ur­
ban middle-class.
The first great boom of the Peruvian industry was in the manufac­
ture of textiles at the beginning of the century. It was accomplished 
with foreign and local investments. The average working day was of 10 to 
15 hours. Workers in other countries were beginning to demand the 8 hours*  
work day; which also became the most important cause for the Peruvian work­
ing force. It was won in 1919. But with the introduction of technology 
and machines workers began to be paid by piece rate and not by hours of 
work. Dangerous working conditions caused many accidents. Labor legisla­
tion was started making management responsible for accidents at the work­
place. It was the first law of this kind for Latin America. There was no 
minimum salary, and women and children were paid less than men. By 1929 
there were 29,000 industrial workers in Peru.
The World Perspective
The Peruvian workers*  movement responded to world events. After 
World War I the capitalist powers had divided the world among themselves 
in an unequal way. The international market determined what the periferic 
countries would charge for their raw materials and how much they would pay 
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for the manufactured products from the central powers.
At this time there were many revolutionary movements: the Mexican 
Revolution, Chinese Nationalism, Indian Independence and most importantly 
the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the creation of the first socialist 
state.
In 1919 Lenin and the organizations familiar with the Soviet experi­
ence created the "Third International." In the syndicalist environment 
it was called the "Red International Syndicalist." Part of the workers 
who had been organized internationally in the Second International defected 
to form the Third International. Now there were two sources of workers*  
movements but the Communist party wanted to dominate and demanded allegi­
ance from branches all over the world in a centralized fashion, quite the 
opposite to the Second International that was socialist/anarchist and de­
centralizing. There were repercussions from both movements among the Peru­
vian labor groups. Intellectuals who travelled abroad returned to Peru 
with new ideas; university students and journalists joined the workers in 
their pleas.
Victor Raul Haya de la Torre from Trujillo became the leader for 
students and workers in his hometown and later in Lima, the capital. He 
organized the fight for the eight-hour workday and helped create popular 
universities where university students taught workers about syndicalism. 
During the 1920’s workers*  groups were repressed by the government of 
Leguia, their universities closed, and their leaders prosecuted. Haya was 
exiled to Panama.
Jose Carlos Mariategui the other brillant intellectual of this move­
ment was influenced by anarchism and socialism while in Europe and pro­
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moted the notion that the workers*  movement be international. It is 
questionable if he joined the Third International since he died the year 
of its founding; however, a fraction of his movement joined it. He had 
broken from APRA.
The depression of the 1930* s was strongly felt by workers in Peru. 
Jobs were lost, strikes went unnoticed, massive discharges and lock-outs 
abounded. Workers*  groups decided to join a political party.
The influence of Fascism was also felt in Peru. Politicians worked 
through government to repress workers pleas, lowered their salaries and 
overworked them. But during World War II Peru joined the allies and all 
workers in Russia as well as in the USA, France or Peru, joined forces to 
fight against fascism. Longer hours were required to produce the goods 
necessary to win the war. Strikes and workers*  pleas were postponed tem­
porarily. Peru was governed by Manuel Prado who came from the rich bour­
geoisie but who also was pro-communist. During his presidential campaign 
he was greeted in Cusco as the "Peruvian Lenin."
At the end of the war and as the cold war between Russia and the USA 
intensified, workers became divided, especially in the capitalist countries. 
A new kind of "free" syndicalism was born; this one not only opposed 
fascism but all kinds of totalitarianism, including communism. The Ameri­
can Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations are 
the American expression of it. In Peru the APRA faction of the workers*  
movement joined them.
The Second World War stimulated the industrial activity of Peru and 
created the condition for the development of a strong working class. The 
workers1 grassroots became dynamic and powerful enough to demand political 
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changes in their favor. There was a proliferation of unions in all 
branches of industry and a surge of pleas for improvements in workers' 
conditions long delayed because of the war.
In 1946 white collar workers also organized in a union, the General 
Federation of Employees, later changed to the "Central Sindical de Em- 
pleados Particulares del Peru." It included civil servants, teachers, bank 
and commercial employees, salesmen and others.
As we have seen during the Korean war and afterwards, industry devel­
oped faster in Peru, thanks to the growth of USA's economic imperialism, 
the law of free enterprise and the abundance of foreign currency. Politi­
cally the country was ruled by the dictator Odria and supported by the 
landed and export-oriented oligarchy. The number of proletariat multi­
plied, but not their activities. The most productive sectors continued to 
be the economic enclaves. Odria followed a social policy designed to ap­
pease the masses without changing the structures. He built hospitals and 
schools, distributed toys and food in the slums and created the National 
Committee for Social Assistance, (Junta Nacional de Asistencia Social). 
More labor legislation was produced, and the Ministry of Labor created.
Not all workers belonged to unions but those who did developed a 
class consciousness and pressed for their rights not only in the workplace 
but also through government. Although government responded mainly to the 
interests of money there were important representatives that advocated for 
workers' rights and some legislation was given. The logical projection of 
this type of socialization would be an insistence on better salaries, bet­
ter working conditions, better rest periods, in short, the opposite of 
becoming involved in risk taking and responsibility in management.
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Evolution of the Labor Legislation Towards Participation
In the Peruvian Constitution of 1932 article 45 reads: "The state 
will support a regime of participation in the benefits of private enter­
prise for employees and workers. It will legislate relations between 
companies and employees and will defend them in general." (12) This arti­
cle remained inactive for several years; no actual Implementation or 
legislation took place.
In 1945 the socialist representative Luciano Castillo resurrected 
article 45 and proposed its implementation, he specifically asked that 
workers be paid for work holidays celebrating the end of the war and the 
victory of the allies. He also asked that all companies with more than 
20 workers should share 10% of their net profits among their workers. 
Furious debates followed. Castillo did not win. Only the pay for the 
Victory holidays was approved. Castillo, then, presented another project 
for companies with yearly profits of more than 6,000 soles. When 
Castillo’s project was debated in Congress there was public reaction from 
the National Society of Industries, the Chambers of Commerce all over the 
country, the National Society of Agriculture, the National Society of Min­
ing, etc. They were all against it. It was called "a social reform of 
dangerous prospectives...an obsolete and inefficient system...the right to 
participate was seen as an interference into management since in order to 
know that they were receiving their rightful 10% they would have had to 
know the state of the company; they would have had to act as controllers 
or auditors." Strong pressure was administered so that article 45 be in­
terpreted as optional and Castillo’s project did not pass.
In 1948 almost immediately after taking over Odria resurrected 
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article 45. He did it as a populist measure to gain the workers*  support 
but in the end it remained optional. Those representing employers re­
quested the Supreme Court to be allowed to discuss it together with re­
presentatives of Labor and with the supervision of Government in order to 
come out with a regulation in which everybody would agree. This was 
granted but it so happened that there were no representatives from Labor. 
The Peruvian Confederation of Workers was being repressed and the majority 
of its leaders were either underground or exiled. A year later an execu­
tive decree was promulgated changing the entire idea of profit sharing and 
making it a bonus given to the workers according to their salary and years 
in the job. Employees would receive proportionally many times more than 
blue collar workers. This extra bonus could be discounted as a pre tax 
expense from the company's books. Capitalists accepted it. There was no 
objection either when a law was introduced whereby if a worker had worked
6 days in a week he was paid the 7th. It was assumed that workers would be 
more reliable in order to deserve the Sunday pay.
The political platform of the Christian Democrats in 1962 advocated a 
reform of private enterprises that "would bring the workers and capitalists 
to the same table to manage the enterprise, to divide profits and to make 
every employee an owner."(13) Elections were annulled that year. In 1963 
the platform of the alliance Popular Action/Christian Democrats (AP/DC) 
presented a less advanced reform. The AP/DC won the elections and once in 
power they presented a project of reform for all those agro-industrial con­
cerns not touched by the Aprista agrarian reform. Among the project’s 
articles was one asking not only for profit sharing but also for partici­
pation in the decision making process by workers.
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Congress did not pass the Christian Democrat project and the agro­
industrial concerns of the Coast were left untouched.
The Social Progressive Movement, a less significant political party, 
inspired in the socialist humanist ideology, also had in its 1962 plat­
form a proposal to reform private enterprises. It called for self-manage­
ment in an evolutionary fashion, passing through a range of co-management 
stages first, it rejected individualism and totalitarian statism, and 
treated capital as one more element of production. Capital was accepted 
in return for fixed interest-bearing securities. Needless to say, this 
proposal did not prosper either.
In February 1968 the Christian Democrats presented yet another pro­
posal to reform private enterprises along the line of their first model. 
The political situation of the country was of great crisis and the pro­
ject did not have a chance to even be discussed. On October 3rd, 1968 
the joint military forces of Peru took over the control of government and 
started the social, political, economic and cultural revolution which will 
be the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
The Peruvian Revolution. Immediate Aspects Leading to the Industrial 
Communities.
An analysis of the situation in Peru since 1968 is a challenge to 
the sociological imagination. For some it is an experiment (1) for others 
"a peculiar revolution" (2), for others finally "a fast catching up with 
development" (3). Yet for those interested in the subject, it is an ex­
perience worth investigating, regardless of how it is labeled.
On October 3rd, 1968, the bourgeoisie democratic government of Peru, 
led by Fernando Belaunde Terry, was overthrown by a left-wing, national­
istic, socialistic, joint military "coup d’etat." This was an unprece­
dented occurrence, because although Latin America is paved with military 
dictatorships most of them are right-wing, law and order, and reactionary 
(4). During its independent republican life Peru has had more "de facto" 
military governments than democratically elected civilian ones. This coup 
is the sixth in thirty years (Monteforee 1973), although of a very dif­
ferent kind.
The total ideological change that the revolution (as the "coup" was 
called from the start) proposed caught everybody by surprise—the right as 
well as the left. This radical ideological approach to economic develop­
ment and societal structuring brought to light and questioned the tradi­
tional models as stereotypes of developed societies. These traditional 
models were considered to be insufficient to solve Third World problems 
because they stemmed from the realities of advanced societies and not from
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those dependent, conflictive and unequal ones inherent to Peru. 
Antecedents
Belaunde was elected president of Peru in 1963, for six years, by 
popular vote and with the support of the Army. It looked as though the 
new government was going to be a "developing" (desarrollista) one, utiliz­
ing modern economics, inclined towards social change and justice for all 
including the workers and peasants. Such had been Belaunde*s  political 
platform.
From the advent it was a weak government, dominated by the conserva­
tive opposition in Congress. This opposition was led by the reactionary 
APRA-Odria (5) alliance and by the Military, both of which at that time 
believed in supporting the "status quo."
Among the unfulfilled promises of the Belaunde presidential platform 
were the nationalization of the International Petroleum Company within 90 
days of his taking office and the agrarian reform which was started but 
not completed in the radical way that had been promised.
According to Mario Manteforte Toledo (6), the negative balance of 
Belaunde*s  presidency was that:
a. Only a few were enriched through the "developmental  model, while 
the majority of the people remained poor.
**
b. The national reserves were exhausted in unrealistic projects 
(such as the marginal highway in the jungle), while disregarding the 
people’s priorities.
c. Belaunde left the country deeply in debt.
d. He permitted foreign capital to buy even more Peruvian industries 
and dominate vital economic activities. According to Fitzgerald (7) three- 
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fourths of mining, one-half of the fishing industry, two-thirds of the 
sugar capital and one-half of the cotton and wool processing plants were 
controlled by foreign enterprises. To these figures should be added one- 
half of all commercial banking, one-third of manufacturing and the owner­
ship of key enterprises in communications, power and trade, and two-thirds 
control over all exports.
e. Belaunde did not solve any of the problems created by under­
development (dual economy, unemployment, enormous discrepancies between 
rich and poor, lack of technology, etc.).
The consequences of these previous failures, leading to the 1968 revolution, 
were:
a. The annual income per capita was $90 in the country, and $260 in 
the city. These figures, however, have no practical meaning. The acquisi­
tive power of money is different in Peru and many people do not live by the 
monetary system but by "barter."
b. Unemployment rose to 25% of the total work force and 75% of all 
new entrants into the labor force.
c. Industry grew 10% while production of food-stuffs remained sta­
tionary, causing Peru to have to import $150 million dollars in food in 
1966.
d. Eight companies controlled 90% of all agrarian production, and 
43% of all exports were in unprocessed minerals.
e. Imports increased by 13% annually and the national money reserves 
fell from $151 million in 1966 to $75 million in 1968.
f. The public debt grew fourfold in five years, until it reached 
$742 million in 1968.
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g. The cost of living rose 91.8% in five years.
h. Public expenditure grew but not the country's production, nor 
consumption, creating inflation and fiscal debt. Export growth slowed 
down, as did manufacturing and the economy as a whole. Meanwhile the pres­
sure of internal demand (and thus import growth) was sustained leading to 
the balance of payments crisis and devaluation of 1967. From 28 soles to
a dollar to 43.50.
Due to the enormous economic crisis, special powers were conferred 
upon Congress to cope with the situation and save the country. Taxes be­
gan to climb in all areas, public expenditure was reduced by $24 million, 
and for the first time there was agreement (or compromise) between the 
Executive and the Legislative powers. But, according to Cotier (8), the 
experiment did not work because the state of crisis was universal and not 
confined only to the high economic strata.
The state of dependency has been repeatedly emphasized as a character­
istic of this epoch. (9) This dependency is obvious in the following areas:
a. Foreign ownership of the mean of production.
b. Foreign power of decision making.
c. Export of capital surplus.
d. Technological control.
e. The creation of consumer demands, which can only be satisfied with 
foreign technology or imports.
f. Control over sources of international finance particularly of­
ficial loans.
During this period there were some changes in the countryside and in 
the city. Due to the penetration of the market economy in the country. 
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the peasants became aware of other realities and fled to the cities, 
bringing with them their ancestral customs and creating the social phenom­
enon known as "ruralization of the cities." They were unskilled and set­
tled in slums around the urban areas, increasing the number of unemployed 
and under-employed. Peru presently has a population of 13,600,000, 41% 
of which live in the cities, 20% in the capital, Lima. Forty-five percent 
of the population is under 16 years of age, and only 4,340,000 of those 
over 16 are active in the labor force.(10) Quijano states (11) that at 
this time (1963-68) the economic dependency had switched from agriculture 
to industry and mining, leaving the masses of peasants unemployed and caus­
ing very low salaries to be paid to the workers, while the gross profits 
were exported to the United States. Ismael Frias (12) says, for example, 
that "between 1950 and 1965 North American enterprises in Peru invested 
$279 million and shipped back to their own country $628 million".
There was also social unrest in the cities, created by popular 
awakening, which the police found difficult to control. Belaunde's doc­
trine of social justice and popular cooperation had permeated the masses 
through the educational system, but no real action had been taken to im­
plement them. So, although there was more education, there was also more 
social unrest, discontent and disillusionment. The "mestizo" (Spanish and 
Indian) became conscious of his class and demanded his rights. This has 
been called "Cholificacion" by Cotier (13). The extreme left declared its 
opposition to the regime as well. Many landowners, in consequence of this 
turmoil, divided their properties among their workers in fear of peasant 
take over, for already some 300 haciendas had been invaded by frustrated 
"campesinos" who could not wait any longer. They took justice into their 
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own hands. Indeed, Guerilla warfare sprouted in several different parts 
of the Sierra. It was called a "Communist upheaval," but the Communist 
party denied participation, and on the contrary, claimed that the 
"guerrilleros" were acting contrary to the workers*  rights to defend them­
selves through legal channels. The peasant movements and the guerrillas 
were violently and totally repressed by the military.
Meanwhile, the industrial sector had increased and become politicized 
by the left. Everybody had become disillusioned and critical of the system 
but there was not one opposition party strong enough to respond to the 
challenge of the situation. The Marxists were divided, so were the Demo- 
crata Cristianos (Christian Democrats) and the Accion Popular (Belaunde’s 
party). APRA was the only large and strong party that remained together, 
but the military had an ancient antipathy for it, which was reciprocated, 
and consequently would not allow the APRA leadership of the country.
It was "vox populi" that the conservative congress and those surround­
ing the President were filling their pockets with the wealth of the country 
and with "contributions" made by the elites to procure governmental support 
and inaction on basic reforms. During all of its independent life until 
1968, Peru has been ruled by a minority of oligarchic individuals who 
managed to influence government.
But nothing set the stage for the final showdown more than the 
"infamous" Pacto de Talara, in which all the representatives of the country 
(government, civilians and military) sold the national interests to for­
eign imperialists. In summary, the "Pacto" stated that the International 
Petroleum Company would return to the Peruvian nation all the oil wells it 
had been exploiting since the beginning of this century (and which were 
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by now almost exhausted), in exchange for the annulment of their debt for 
unpaid taxes (the debt amounted to $690 million dollars). In addition, 
the Peruvian government would allot the I.P.O. 1,000,000 Km^ in the 
Amazon jungle for further exploration and extraction. The I.P.O. would 
retain the concession of the oil refinery and buy all the oil from the 
Peruvian government at a price set by the I.P.O. But this was not all. 
The scandal reached a climax when page No. 11 of the final contract (on 
which the price at which the oil was to be sold was stated) was "lost.” 
The government insisted on signing the "Pacto" without it. Belaunde was 
unable to satisfactorily account for all this, and the thought of a mili­
tary "coup" began to be in everybody’s minds and conversations. People 
believed that they could not be in a worse situation than they were al­
ready in. 
The Revolution:
According to Augusto Zimmerman (14) the military takeover of October 
3rd, 1968 was not improvised because of the unbearable circumstances. It 
was a revolution meticulously planned in advance. Its goal was to return 
to the people the ownership of the natural resources and of the means of 
production. In addition, it would reestablish national sovereignty, doing 
away with foreign imperialism and the domestic oligarchy. There is a chap­
ter in the Peruvian constitution which justifies such a takeover when the 
rights of the people are being abused. This "protection against abuse" 
clause has been the excuse for previous military "coups d’etat" as well.
In their first communique the joint command of the Armed Forces (Army, 
Navy and Air Force) explained why it had had no choice but to take over 
command of the government of the country. Among its reasons were the econ­
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omic and political crises caused by unworthy Peruvians who had joined 
with imperialistic interests to frustrate the rightful wishes of the com­
mon people for social justice and needed structural change. An additional 
reason was the immorality of the politicians in all branches of government, 
who had betrayed, through their actions, the faith of the people who had 
elected them. The day of the coup, the famous Communicado No. 1 was is­
sued:
Communicado No. 1 (15): The Armed Forces have observed 
with increasing patriotic concern how the country has 
been overburdened with political, economic and moral 
crises. We had hoped that through the democratic pro­
cess, the joining of all forces would bring about the 
necessary changes, but this has not happened. We are 
disillusioned.
In addition to all these misdeeds, the unconstitutional 
powers granted to the Executive and the selling of our 
natural resources to the I.P.C., cause us to foresee 
uncontrollable consequences. This is only an example 
of the moral decomposition of the country. And this is 
why the Armed Forces, in fulfilling its constitutional 
right to defend the country and its wealth for the 
Peruvians...has no choice but to take hold of the govern­
ment with the goal of transforming the present social, 
economic and cultural structures, maintaining a 
nationalistic attitude, a clear independent position 
against imperialism of any kind, restoring the principle 
of authority and respect for the law, bringing back the 
reign of justice and of morality in all fields of na­
tional activity.
The Revolutionary Government declares that it will honor 
all previous international agreements signed by Peru 
with other countries and that we will be faithful to 
the western and Christian tradition that we will en­
courage foreign investment that would abide by the laws 
and needs of this nation.
The Revolutionary Government calls the people to join 
with the Armed Forces in order to work for social 
justice, dynamic national development, and the restora­
tion of our moral values.
After this first pronouncement several broadcasts followed, speci­
fying the ideology and directions the revolutionary government would take. 
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The goal was said to be "a social democracy of full participation.” This 
type of ideological orientation, originating as it did from the military, 
was completely unheard of in Latin America. The military now was stress­
ing basic structural change, and not the maintenance of the "status quo"; 
of helping the masses and not those in economic power; of getting back the 
natural resources; of defying international retaliation. The military 
said it was assuming power as a governing institution for an indefinite 
period of time, with a clear anti-imperialistic orientiation. They speci­
fically said: "We are not capitalists nor are we communists." They 
oriented their ideology and activities toward socialism and reformism, 
basing their economy on a pluralistic approach, but maintaining the State 
as the main entrepreneur.
The Military, mainly through its spokesman President Velasco (16), 
has justified its procedure by saying that it took over to end the ex­
ploitation of the people by the oligarchy and their selling of the coun­
try to foreign imperialism. It took power in order to bring the needed 
social, economic and cultural changes that the Oligarchy was obstructing. 
Here is a sample of the revolution's ideology.
Our position is defined in terms of a revolutionary 
humanism.... This position picks up the best of the 
legacies of the Christian, libertarian, and socialist 
traditions ... [and] represents the confluence of the 
most illustrious streams of revolutionary thought of 
our own historic tradition. It constitutes the basis 
for a new socio-political conceptualization in Peru ... 
which has as its object the construction of a fully 
participatory social democracy ... a system based on 
a moral order of solidarity, not individualism ... 
[In such a system] the means of production are pre­
dominantly social property, under the direct control 
of those who generate the wealth from their work. 
[Within the] political order [of such a system] the 
power of decision ... is diffuse and rests essential­
ly in social, economic, and political institutions 
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which are conducted by the men and women who make 
them up, with a minimum of intermediaries, or with 
no intermediaries whatsoever.... (17)
Those of the Military who took over power were middle class people 
who had undergone training not only in the martial arts, but also in 
economics, political science, sociology, etc., at the CAEM (Academia de 
Altos Estudios Militares), the most important center for the development 
of Peruvian national security strategy (18), the school of Intelligence, 
the school of War and other similar military academies. Peruvian mili­
tary are known for their emphasis on education. They are among the best 
when attending foreign graduate schools. The CAEM has been given much 
credit for preparing the military personnel, for making them aware of the 
social, economic and political situation of the country. However, it 
should be stated that the CAEM is only a one-year training school and 
nobody could know everything the military knew when the "golpe" was given, 
from that limited instruction.
Nonetheless the new more unconventional ideological orientation of 
the military take over can perhaps be explained through an investigation 
into the orientations many of the military received at the CAEM and later 
developed in post graduate studies. The CAEM was created some 25 years 
ago, for the purpose of studying the country to better understand its 
problems, in order to defend Peru if and when war might break out. Ideo­
logically the students were influenced by two schools of thought. First 
of all, the literature they were exposed to was openly anti-communist. A 
few Marxist books were selectively chosen, while North American anti­
insurgent literature was abundant. The second influence involved the 
teachings of Father Lebret, a French dominican priest, and founder of the 
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school of thought known as "Economics and Humanism." He had done socio­
economic studies in the area of his specialty in Peru, he broadly 
lectured to many audiences, including, most importantly, the CAEM.
In spite of all these orientations, the CAEM graduates were regarded 
by the rest of the Armed Forces as "leftists." Many continued their stu­
dies in France and the U.S.A. Although the CAEM was not directly in­
volved in the 1968 "coup" (19), the training the Institute had provided 
its officers contributed toward a more egalitarian perspective, which 
is illustrated both in the studies which emanated from these students, 
and their reactions to later governmental edicts, as will be seen. Mili­
tary officers at the CAEM studied a wide range of special problems. These 
included questions of land reform, tax structure, foreign policy and in­
surgency, and involved the formulation of policies and reforms. The re­
sult was that military policy became closely linked to political policy.
As the military students of the CAEM progressed in their research 
into the country’s situation, they discovered that a state of "latent 
insurgency" existed because 0.6% of the population owned 20% of the land, 
and that 90% of the people, conversely, only owned 10% of it (20). They 
wrote, however, many important reports to Congress illustrating the prob­
lems and making suggestions for change. These reports were disregarded.
Another important occurrence also helped the students to reassess 
their roles. During the time of the guerrilla movement and peasant re­
volts, the military was requested to eliminate the insurgents. However, 
as they became deeply involved with the people and their problems, they 
realized that they were helping restore a social order of injustice and 
exploitation—that they were serving only the privileged few. They were 
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restoring the "status quo."
The ideology of the revolution was widely publicized throughout the 
media from the beginning. There was not, however, an institution specially 
in charge of teaching the people what was meant by a "social democracy of 
full participation," why political parties were not necessary any more nor 
elections for official positions. As a matter of fact only those literate 
adults had been voting thus far. How the gradual decentralization and 
transference of power to the people, until all workers took over the manage­
ment of their enterprises and the government itself, was not explained, and 
this was perhaps a weakness in the plan of the new government. Organized 
instruction did not occur until, in 1971, when SINAMOS was created (the 
National System for Support of Social Mobilization). It was a government 
organization divided into six branches in charge of organizing the masses 
at the base in agriculture, industry, urban areas, squatter settlements 
and educational centers. The head of all six branches in each region was 
the Military Regional General Commander.
"Furthermore, the ideology asserts that the participation is to be 
achieved within Peruvian Hispanic traditions ... In terms of implementing 
this ideology, government agencies rather than political parties become 
the means of transmission for the expression and resolution of citizen 
concensus." (20a) All local units of participation are included. The 
people increasingly participate in the decision-implementing process at 
the local and regional levels, but always in concordance with government 
officials at that same level. Basic policies confined to be determined 
by the governing apparatus at the center.
Carlos Franco, one of the official ideologists of the Revolution,
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explains SINAMOS and the politicizing process (21).
SINAMOS is created to politicize the masses. According to Franco, 
SINAMOS is not a political party, because it does not want to obtain 
power—it already has it. SINAMOS*  main purpose is to provide official 
coordination, channeling for all initiatives relating to citizen partici­
pation. It wants the people to take over through their awareness of their 
rights and responsibilities in a social democracy of full participation. 
The political structure behind SINAMOS is:
a. SINAMOS is a state institution. It includes already existing 
government institutions whose responsibility relates to participation.
b. The state is a political, judicial, administrative, economic, 
financial, etc. organization. SINAMOS, as part of the state, supports the 
infrastructure from within.
c. The state assumes the people's representation because all its re­
forms are geared toward bringing social justice and benefits to all the 
workers. The state accomplishes the structural reforms and prepares the 
people, through SINAMOS, to take over the management of their interests.
d. SINAMOS is deliberately transitory; in the governmental "trans­
mission belt" bypassing serious social bureaucracies, (22) when the people 
become conscious and responsible for their government it will become in­
active. The political power will be progressively transferred to the 
representatives of the social organizations with minimum intervention by 
the state.
e. SINAMOS supports all initiative that comes from the people at the 
base of the organizations.
On the Global Plan 1971-75 for development of Peru we read:
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This organization ... must be shaped into horizontal 
and vertical nets of integration...[in order to take] 
the decisive step for the construction of a society 
of solidarity.... This organization provides the bases 
for effective participation ... and a rational struc­
ture of communication with the Government assists the 
process.... But special mechanisms will be needed to 
promote the direct and effective participation of the 
population in the process of decision-making and the 
carrying out of programs and projects of development. 
These go along with the formal instruments to be 
established at the level of administrative regions and 
municipal organization. This refers specifically to 
the organization of the bases of a system of inter­
action, consultation, and joint programming among the 
development services and the organized population. (23)
The above outlines the official doctrine pertaining to this politiciz­
ing organism. SINAMOS is perhaps the least understood of all the revolu­
tionary creations—one that has penetrated all social and economic insti­
tutions with the aims previously stated, but which has also been perhaps 
misused by established politicians (communists especially) who seemed un­
able to leave their personal and previous beliefs behind and work for the 
stated ideology of the revolution.
The Reforms
Although the Military started the structural changes it believed the 
country needed immediately after taking power, it did not reveal its secret 
plan until July 28th, 1974. This plan was called the "Plan Inca," and ac­
cording to Zimmermann,(26) Press Secretary during the Velasco Regime, it 
had been meticulously prepared well in advance of the "coup." There is 
much controversy as to the accuracy of this statement, since no draft copy 
of the plan was ever available. However, perhaps too much time has been 
lost in speculation when the truth is that with the actual plan or merely 
with guidelines, the structural reforms were introduced and continue to be 
implemented. The military’s own statement seems to corroborate this hypoth­
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esis that there were only general guidelines and that the circumstances 
as they presented themselves made for reconsideration of the goals. The 
much repeated declaration, when the military are asked about their road, 
or where the revolution is going is invariably, "Our road is looking back 
at what we have accomplished, we are making the road, breaking through new 
soil. There is no road ahead but what we open."
The main thrust of the development program concerned the transference 
of the real economic power, decision and policy making, from the entrepre­
neur and investors to the workers themselves. This transference was to 
create a proportional balance between capital and labor in order to at­
tain a communitarian society in which capital and labor would be equally 
balanced and the state would serve them both. The first public pronounce­
ment by the new regime regarding economic organization was by Premier 
Minister Montagne on December 1968. He specified that the goal of the 
government was to reform the firm, orienting it toward worker participation 
in profits and management to protect cooperative firms organized by their 
workers to prevent it from falling into foreign debtors hands. (25)
The first step in the plan was the nationalization of the I.P.C. but 
shortly after, all natural energy sources came under government control. 
Limited control of all industrial production was planned, but other in­
dustries such as the fishing industry, were forced by special circumstances 
into nationalization: Ecological changes made this industry collapse and 
the government thereafter took it over.
The government also took over certain strategic industries to reduce 
dependency on foreign capital. The indifference of the domestic bourgeoisie 
towards its involvement in private investment likewise enlarged the state 
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ownership of the means of production. The expansion of state enterprises 
is seen as a means rather than an end in itself. Eventually the state 
gained control of over one-third of industrial output and one-fifth of all 
the workforce (27) in the productive modern sector (excluding public serv­
ice employees). The state regarded itself as the "leader” of the economic 
process rather than the "state capitalist."
There has been an obvious shift in capital ownership. The foreign 
and domestic private capital has declined, while the state and group- 
ownership by the workers, has increased. This redistribution, however, 
involved only that one-third of the modern economic sector which was al­
ready organized. The main burden of this economic transformation and 
capital accumulation in the public sector has been borne by the state enter­
prises. The success of the Peruvian economy depends on its effectiveness. 
The state owns forty-five companies covering many sectors: energy, exports, 
marketing, fishing, services, shipping, railway, communications, housing, 
etc. Many of them already existed prior to 1968. To insure success, the 
state has borrowed from foreign and domestic private capital and lent it 
to the managers of these state enterprises. This is a form of reallocation 
of development finances.
Most of the banking system is under state ownership as well, and the 
remainder is state controlled. Credit has been channelled away from 
commerce and speculation.
When Peru nationalized the I.P.C. without compensation the Inter­
national Bank for Regional Development cut all credits to the country, 
although in this isolated case, nationalization involved specific reasons.
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The U.S.A, also cut its sugar quota to Peru. Arms supplies and foreign 
aid were also frozen. This effectively denied Peru all access to exter­
nal credit except the most expensive international sources. Other govern­
ment nationalizations were retaliated against by a greater constriction 
of external credit. The U.S.A, intervened so that international sources 
of credit such as the "Paris Club" also withdrew their loans to Peru (28). 
North American foreign policy thus revealed its domination by capitalist 
private enterprises.
In 1972 tense Peruvian-U.S.A. relations eased. The external debt 
was renegotiated, the sugar quota was raised and new trade agreements were 
signed. Some say it was because Peru has large natural reserves that 
United States need, while others because there was a secret payment for 
the nationaliz tion of the I.P.C. In 1975 it was possible again to 
refinance the external debt. U.S.A, signed favorable contracts with 
the Peruvian government to exploit the oil and copper reserves. It would 
appear that the Peruvian "generosity" in this case was aroused by the need 
indeed, desperation, to settle other issues and continue the development 
reforms. Foreign capital has been excluded from all natural resource in­
dustries, communications and power, but it still remains to a considerable 
extent in manufacturing sectors.
In the domestic arena the principal reforms concerned the structure 
of the land tenure and industrial ownership. The agrarian reform under 
President Velasco was the most radical reform in Latin America. It did 
not parcel large industrial states but formed cooperatives and agrarian 
societies (Agrarian Production Cooperatives and Agricultural Society of 
Socia Interest) to continue exploitation with modern technology. Ex­
62
owners were paid in cash for their cattle and in government bonds payable 
over 20 years at 5% interest for the land. These bonds could be used as 
collateral for raising industrial investment finance.
The bulk of the agricultural work force, however, has not been 
benefitted by the reform; some 60% work their own small plots and 15% are 
seasonal labor. (They have not been benefitted by the reform either.)
The land reform has changed the pattern of ownership but not the struc­
ture of allocation of land to labor. Only one-fourth of the rural popula­
tion is permanently employed and has benefitted. The trade of food for 
merchandise continues much the same. Surplus is reinvested and retained 
as labor income in agriculture, instead of being diverted to other sectors.
Industrial crops are well organized, while food crops are technologi­
cally backward, poorly organized and lacking finance. Through state in­
tervention (SINAMOS) the new owners are learning how to manage their land.
The industrial or enterprise reform provides workers a share not only 
in profits but also in management. Workers within each firm employing six 
or more workers receive a fixed percentage of their company’s profits, some 
distributed immediately in cash, but more retained as commonly owned stock, 
which is eventually to be half-owned by the "labor community" (the col­
lectivity of the firm’s workers). The community’s representatives have the 
right to participate in management decisions, audit the company’s books and 
records, and generally to assure that the workers’ actual and prospective 
interests are being protected.(30) Similar mechanisms exist in the mining, 
fishing and telecommunications sectors. But since these are government owned, 
the workers are not given shares in those companies but instead receive govern­
ment bonds.(31)
Workers’ participation is considered by the government to be the 
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central aspect of popular democracy of full participation. This reform 
serves 38% of the labor force, which is in the modern sector.(32)
Social property is a new mode of production since 1974. Society owns 
the enterprise, and all workers share responsibility in managing and policy 
making as well as in profits. To start, they draw seed money from a common 
government fund which they have to repay. It was expected that the social 
property sector would be predominant in the years to come: But after June 28, 
1976, it is considered another form of economic pluralism; it is not priori- 
tary anymore within the country.
Summarizing, we can see that Peru has a pluralistic economy, with four 
types of enterprises: state, social property, reformed private (with labor 
community) and unreformed private (for small-scale firms).
Notwithstanding all the structural reforms, Peru is still an under­
developed country with a small and inarticulate industrial base, export- 
emphasized dynamics and dual economy (a modern industrial sector and a back­
ward, nonintegrated artisan and craft sector). The diversified primary ex­
port sector is the prime mover of the economic activity and accounts for 
most of the investment profits, tax revenues and foreign exchange. This 
sector comprises one-fifth of the GNP and one-fourth of the modern sector 
output. It still depends highly on imported technology (33).
Throughout the reform period there has been a continuous conflict be­
tween state and foreign capital, between the desire to reduce dependence and 
to acquire foreign cooperation for specific state projects. There is still 
the desire to maintain economic growth and negotiations to extract oil and 
copper while nationalizing foreign enterprises, and to rationalize the 
basic industry and encourage private domestic interest at the same time.
NOTES FROM CHAPTER IV
1) Lowenthal, Abraham F. Rpt. The Peruvian Experiment. Princeton
University Press, (Princeton, 1975).
2) Howsbawm, E. J. "Peru: The Peruvian Revolution." New York Review of
Books, (December 16, 1971).
3) Fitzgerlad, E.V.K. The State and Economic Development: Peru Since
1968 (Cambridge University Press, London, 1976).
4) Bolivia 1952, Panama, and Cuba are the only exceptions.
5) Chaplin, David, ed. Peruvian Nationalism: A Corporatist Revolution
(Transaction Books, New Brunswick, 1976) p. 7.
6) Monteforte Toledo, Mario. Revolution Militar a la Peruana (Institute
de Investigaciones Sociales, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de 
Mexico, Mexico 20 D.F. 1973).
7) Fitzgerald. Op. Cit. p. 20.
8) Monteforte cites Cotier. See also Cotier in Lowenthal. Op. Cit.
"New Mode of Political Dominations" in Chaplin. Op. Cit. "The 
Mechanics of Internal Domination."
9) Fitzgerald. Op. Cit., Cotier. Op. Cit. and Quijano, Anibal.
Nacionalismo Neo-Imperialismo y Militarismo en el Peru (Ed. 
Periferia, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1971).
10) From several sources mainly Fitzgerald. Op. Cit. Ministry of In­
dustries directly.
11) Quijano, Anibal. Op. Cit.
12) Monteforte. Op. Cit. quotes Frias.
13) Cotier in Chaplin. Op. Cit. p. 63.
14) Zimmermann, Augusto. El Plan Inca: Objetivo Revolucion Peruana
(Empresa Editorial del Diario Oficial El Peruano, Lima, Peru, 
1973?).
15) Communicado No. 1 Oficina Nacional de Informacion, Octubre, 1968.
16) Velasco, Alvarado, Juan. La Voz de la Revolucion (OMI, Lima 1972)
also Chaplin. Op. Cit. p. 930 and 931.
64
65
17) Velasco's speech celebrating the 150 years of the Republic.
18) Einaudi, Luigi R. "Revolution from Within?" in Chaplin. Op. Cit.
p. 406-409.
19) Monteforte. Op. Cit.
20) Idem. p. 38.
20a) Chaplin. Op. Cit. p. 432.
21) Franco, Carlos. La Revolucion Participatoria (Editorial Mosca Azul,
1975, Lima, Peru)
22) Palmer, David Scott & Middlebrook, Kerin Jay. "Corporatist Participa­
tion under Military Rule in Peru in Chaplin. Op. Cit. p. 439.
23) Plan Nacional de Desarrollo para 1971 - 1975 Plan Global Vol. 1.
24) Zimmermann. Op. Cit.
25) Knight, Peter T. "New Reforms in Economic Organization" in Lowenthal
Op. Cit. p. 375.
26) Ibid. p. 378
27) Fitzgerald. Op. Cit.
28) Ibid.
29) This has been changed since February 1976 when the "Ley de Pequena
Empresa" was given.
30) An indepth study of the industrial reform will follow.
31) Lowenthal. Op. Cit.




The Peruvian Model of Co-Management: The Industrial Community.
In July 1970 the Government of Peru promulgated a law (1) introduc­
ing a number of important reforms in the industrial sector. Earlier that 
year a draft of the proposed law had been made public so that the inter­
ested parties (industrialists, workers, unions, etc.) would express their 
opinions and make recommendations. In the draft, however, there was no 
mention of the most important reform the Law of Industries would bring: 
The creation of an industrial community, a legal entity which would re­
present the workers in a private corporation and give them a share in 
ownership, management and profits. In September of the same year the Law 
of Industrial Communities (2) was promulgated, defining, clarifying and 
giving the regulations to implement this new type of institution inside 
private corporations. Sixty days were allowed for each corporation to 
form its industrial community.
What is an Industrial Community?
The industrial community of any private corporation is a corporate 
body having legal personality in private law, to which all full-time em­
ployees of the private corporation automatically belong. The corporation 
must have more than six workers or a net profit of more than a million 
soles.(3) The IC has three basic components:
a) Profit sharing. All workers participate of 10% of the net profit be­
fore taxes of the corporation, half in proportion to their basic salary 
and half in proportion to the number of months worked during the previous
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year.(4) Workers can also share in the dividends from shares owned by 
the IC. Up to 80% of dividends received by the IC can be distributed 
individually among the workers according to time worked in the company.
b) Participation in the ownership of the corporation through the alloca­
tion by law of 15% of the pretax net profit of the corporation to the IC 
for the purpose of buying shares of the corporation. When the IC owns 
50% of the industries’ registered stockholders equity, the IC ceases to 
increase its shares of equity but continues to receive 15% of the company’s 
pre-tax net income, to be used to purchase additional stock if the capital 
equity is increased and for other purposes specified in the Law. The IC 
can acquire its 50% interest in the corporation by buying new shares from 
the corporation or from other stockholders. When the IC obtains 50% of 
the outstanding shares it issues participation shares in the IC to each 
worker in proportion to the time he has worked in the company. The parti­
cipation shares are not transferable and the IC is obligated to purchase 
them when the worker ceases to be employed by the corporation. The shares 
of the corporation remain the collective property of the IC and must be 
voted as a block. The number of participation in the IC increases as the 
investment in the parent company increases.(5)
c) Participation in the management of the corporation. The IC partici­
pates in the management of the enterprise through the shareholders’ meet­
ing and the board of directors. In both bodies the IC votes as a single 
block. It is represented in the shareholders’ meeting by its chairman, 
who is elected by the membership as a whole, and in the board of directors 
by one or more nominees appointed annually by the board of the IC.
Each representative of the community on the board of directors of the 
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enterprise enjoys equal rights with the other members and must be given 
access to any information he needs for the exercise of his duties. The 
law expressly authorizes him to examine "all account books and documents 
relevant to the determination of the company’s net income."(6)
The law provides that the IC must be represented on the board of 
directors as soon as it is established, irrespective of whether it owns 
shares in the company yet. The number of IC representatives on the board 
of directors, which at first is limited to one, increases proportionally 
according to the number shares owned, and so of course does its voting 
strength. Similarly, the proportion of the shares owned by the IC also 
determines the influence it can wield, through its chairman, in the share­
holders’ meeting.
According to the Law of IC’s, the objectives of the IC are:
a) To strengthen private enterprise through joint action of workers in 
management, production and ownership of the companies in which they work and 
to promote harmonious interrelation between capital and labor.
b) To unify the action of workers to defend their rights.
c) To promote the development of the worker in all aspects: cultural, 
social, professional and technical.
It is important to note that since the IC is created by law, everybody 
that works in a company with an IC has the right to belong to it but does 
not have the right not to belong to it. The ability of the IC to function 
is based on the profitability of the company. The more revenue the IC 
receives, the faster it can purchase shares of the company. Thus manage­
ment remains dependent on property rights as in a traditional capitalist 
enterprise, although the workers become part owners of the firm. It can be 
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considered, then, that it is a requirement to qualify for ownership to be 
a full-time employee.
Mechanisms of Co-Management
The IC is a self-managed organization placed in a private company in 
order to transform it into a co-managed company. Thus, in the fashion of 
self-management the IC board of directors or council is subordinate to the 
general assembly, must follow its recommendations and give account of its 
actions. In the same way the representatives of the IC to the company 
board of directors are subject and respond to the council.
Any member of the IC can be elected to the council except for those 
who own shares individually or union leaders. No council member can serve 
two consecutive terms, nor can two offices be exercised at the same time. 
The term of office is two years.
The law of IC’s has never been reglamented, however, each IC is re­
quested to make its own statutes and by laws and to abide by them. The 
legal power of coersion is also missing. There are no penalties in the law 
for no performance and there is still controversy as to the real meaning 
of the law's articles.
The Powers of the Council:
Since not all the members of the IC can administer and direct the IC 
because they are too many a council is elected every 2 years to carry on 
the representation of the whole. As the executive organ of the IC the coun­
cil has the power:
a) To direct and administer the IC and its funds.
b) To name the IC representatives to the company's board. It also has 
the power to remove them if they do not follow the instructions of the 
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council. The representative is only the spokesman for the group.
c) To advise and control the IC representative to the company’s board.
d) To call the general assembly.
e) To prepare the books of the IC as for any other corporation the balance. 
When leaving the corporation
Those who decide to leave the corporation before the IC has reached 
the 50% stock ownership, receive an amount equivalent to half the stock­
holders’ equity owned by the IC divided by the number of days everybody 
has worked multiplying that number by the days the retiring worker has 
worked. When the IC already owns 50% of the shares outstanding of the 
company the value of the participation shares owned by the worker tracks 
the market value of the company stock. The liquidated amount received by 
the worker upon leaving the company is the market value of his participa­
tion shares plus any other patrimony the IC owns divided by the days 
everybody has worked and multiplied by the number of days worked by the 
worker who is leaving.
A person who does not work in a company cannot own shares through its 
IC. In case of death the workers’ heirs receive the distribution (amount 
of his participation in cash). 
Co-management when the IC reaches the 50%
The law does not specify who will be chairman of the company’s board 
when the IC reaches the 50% of the capital. There are several alterna­
tives that can be implemented, one is to draw lots every time the chairman 
needs to be changed, another, to draw lots only the first time to alternate 
from thereon, (one time the IC representative, the next time the representa­
tive of the individual capitalist), a third alternative could be to let 
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the "fuero privativo" (the legal entity recently created to settle IC 
problems) make the decision.(8)
When the IC share equally on the board can also request for equal 
management participation at the general manager’s level and even for in­
tervention at lower levels such as work units. The outcome of such co­
management would also make for different orientations in the implementa­
tion of this model.(9) 
The creation of an elite of workers
The IC does not represent a radical change of the capitalist system, 
it provides opportunity for workers to become capitalists. The goal of 
any private company is profit. The workers through their IC are share­
holders and their goal becomes profit too. While some successful companies 
have been yielding substantial profits which are being distributed among 
their workers through the 10% individual profit sharing and the 15% share 
given to the IC, there are companies that do not yield profits and their 
workers have not been able to raise their standard of living nor the IC's 
to buy the companies*  stock. This has produced a division among workers 
themselves who are enticed by the individualist profit motive of capital­
ist ideology often without regard or interest in their fellow workers in 
other companies.
In the government owned industries there is a "compensation community 
fund" where the most profitable companies shares their profits with those 
which are not so successful. There is not such mechanism in the private 
reformed sector yet. 
Who pays for the 15% allotted to the IC?
According to the Law (11) 15% of the net profit before taxes goes to 
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the IC to buy into the company's capital. It would seem, therefore, that 
the original owners of the capital are paying for it. However, since the 
distribution is before taxes the government is helping to finance the IC’s 
through loss in tax revenues. The corporate tax rate is 25Z in Peru thus 
the government is providing a quarter of the 15%. Furthermore, the workers 
as they increase their shareholding also increase their share of the pre­
tax net profit from which the 15% is deducted.
Illustrating the IC
Following are several "tables" that will give us an idea of the size 
and type of the companies, the number of workers and the progress they have 
made in buying stock-holding equities.
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Percent Population Economically Active In Peru
Year 1971 1973 1974
Employment
Unemployed 8.8 7.5 5.5
Underemployed 27.4 22.1 27.8
Adequately 
Employed 62.8 70.4 66.7
Undetermined 1.0 - 0.5
Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0
Percent Population Economically Active in Peruvian Industry
Year 1971 1973 1974
Unemployed 6.2 5.3 4.7
Underemployed 26.4 18.9 27.0
Adequately 
Employed 66.9 75.8 68.3
Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number of Industrial Communities and of People Employed 
in Them







Source: Ministry of Industries and Tourism.
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Companies and Workers by Activity (1973)
Type of Industry
Companies Workers
Number % of Total Number % of Total
20 Food 549 16.38 25,854 13.22
21 Drinks 137 4.09 10,346 5.29
22 Tobacco 4 0.11 780 0.40
23 Textiles 299 8.92 31,899 16.31
24 Ready to wear 384 11.46 16,183 8.28
25 Wood and cork 119 3.55 4,415 2.26
26 Wood furniture 158 4.71 8,249 4.22
27 Paper and products 
made of paper 40 1.19 3,676 1.88
28 Printing, newspapers 170 8.05 10,129 5.18
29 Leather 57 1.70 4,212 2.15
30 Rubber 17 0.51 1,576 0.81
31 Chemical products 245 4.31 19,323 9.84
33 Minerals not metalic 169 5.04 11.136 5.70
34 Basic metalics 27 0.81 6,976 3.57
35 Metalic products 219 6.53 9,026 4.62
36 Machinery not electric 98 2.92 5,963 3.05
37 Electric industry 68 2.03 5,502 2.81
38 Transportation material 401 11.96 14,562 7.45
Totals 3,352 100.00 195,351 100.00
Source: Ministry of Industries and Tourism.
Note: The sum of the figures is in error by less than 10% but I have 
copied it exactly as given to me by MIT. This error, however 
is not important to our purpose here since the point is to ob­
tain an understanding of the approximate size of private com­
panies in Peru and the workers they employ.
75
This table and prior table differ in totals.
OWNERSHIP BY IC’S STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY (12-31-73)
Type of Industry
Companies Stockholders’ Equity
Number 7. of Total Total($1000)% owned by IC's
20 539 17.50 7,099,889 5.6
21 147 4.77 5,708,320 4.7
22 2 0.10 241,848 6.6
23 363 11.79 6,529,406 6.9
24 229 7.44 1,145,098 8.6
25 107 3.47 924,352 1.5
26 124 4.03 408,572 7.8
27 46 1.49 2,238,710 1.5
28 180 5.84 692,608 3.7
29 58 1.88 991,108 9.4
30 33 1.07 1,352,517 11.3
31 267 8.67 11,777,974 3.2
33 161 5.23 7,562,284 1.3
34 27 0.88 11,948,350 0.5
35 236 7.66 2,386,165 8.1
36 107 3.47 1,523,666 5.1
37 99 3.28 1,922,708 8.4
38 100 3.25 1,160,081 5.6
39 254 8.25 3,202,237 10.4
Totals 3,080 100.00 76,610,792 5.8
Source: Ministry of Industries and Tourism.
$ means Peruvian Soles
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Classification of Industrial Communities by Number of Members (1973)
Company Size By IC'S Workers
Number of Total
Workers Number % of Total Workers % of Total
1 to 6 223 7 1,140 1
7 to 9 402 12 3,063 1
10 to 14 619 18 15,722 8
15 to 19 424 13 7,320 4
20 to 100 1,297 39 62,266 32
More than 100 387 11 106,021 54
Totals 3,352 100 195,532 100
Source: Ministry of Industries and Tourism
NOTES OF CHAPTER V
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need the IC (it’s distributed to all workers individually) it is 
considered part of the package because it came about in the same 
law of industries that created the IC. The history of profit 
sharing and its implementation is also closely related to the 
activities of the IC. Thanks to CONACI (the National Confeder­
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142.
6) Modificaciones de la Ley General de Industrias. Decree Law 19262
art. 40. Promulgated January 2, 1972.
7) El Fuero Privativo de Comunidades Laborales, to deal with problems
related to the IICC. Was created on June 2, 1975. It is a 
court of appeals for labor communities only, it, however, still 
lacks coersion according to expert opinions I have consulted. 
There are no penalties on the law for no performance.
8) See table A. for the advantages and disadvantages of such alter­
natives .
9) See table B. for the advantages and disadvantages of increased co­
management to other areas.
10) See table C. to see how the 15% is distributed before and after
the IC reaches the 50% of the social capital.
11) Decree Law 18350 Ley General de Industrias, titulo VIII ast. 24.
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PART III
DIALECTICAL ANALYSIS: THE ACTORS
Chapter VI will tell us what the three great actors involved in the 
IC understand by it. In Chapters III and IV we have seen their previous 
socialization, therefore, their reactions to the IC legislation should 
not be surprising when seen from each group's vantage point.
Government as the legislator gave the law but also it gave the of­
ficial interpretation that responded to its mentality as bourgeois middle 
class people. The ideology of the revolution, as a nationalistic, social­
ist, humanist and Christian movement, has been explained in Chapter III 
and can be found in the official interpretation to the IC as we shall see.
Capitalists in Peru, as we have seen, have a long history of being a 
consular bourgeoisie, serving a distant metropolis, not interested in being 
nationalistic, much less socialistic; their activity has always responded 
to a capitalist system, where capital deserves all profits and labor is 
just one more tool.
Labor was born in an economy of enclaves and later developed into what 
is known as urban proletariat. The class consciousness of the workers was 
created in the fight for social justice and improved working conditions. 
While workers demanded the rightful share of wealth due to labor, they 
never pretended to become capitalists themselves.
When the Law of Industries and the Law of IC were promulgated each 
group interpreted it according to their previous socialization, each one 
had a world of typifications where this new institution had to fit, each
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one was different according to the group.
At first there was not enough information as to what the government 
really intended. The law was never regulated, and therefore; each group 
made its own interpretations which would best fit its previous expectation.
In Chapter VII we shall see how the different expectations of capital 
and labor cause conflict in particular situations and each struggles to 
impose its solutions. Sometimes labor dominates and other times capital­
ists. At every instance the government redefines its basic concepts to 
reach a balance that would solve the conflict. This balance is temporary 
since the dynamics of power and the expectations of each group for the IC 
cause the balance to tilt and be lost. This situation will continue as 
long as capital and labor have such different expectations. If an agree­
ment is reached, as the government expects, a new conflict between rich and 
poor IC’s will break out. And if this last conflict is resolved through 
"comunidad de compensacion" still remaining will be the tension between 
those gainfully employed in the modern sector and those for whom all these 
reforms have not yet arrived.
We shall also give the latest edition of the interpretation of the 
law of IC where we can foresee a radical change, this time due to forces 
external to the process. Peru has a huge external debt which required re­
financing (See Chapter IV), forcing the country to accept loans from pri­
vate New York Banks which demanded political changes as a condition for 
the loans. One of the changes is that co-management and self-management 
be phased out. In the idiology of the revolution this request is a stab 
in the back because self-management is the basis of the basic reforms, 




In previous chapters three main actors involved in the reform of the 
enterprise have been defined: the government who gave the law, and capi­
tal and labor who were affected by it. Faithful to their previous so­
cialization the three groups have a different understanding of the mean­
ing of the Law of IC. In this chapter we shall examine each one’s parti­
cular point of view and reaction to the new legislation.
1) Government
Even before the law was promulgated President Velasco was saying in 
his speeches that "the reform of the enterprise...would not be damaging 
to the entrepreneurs; on the contrary it would harmonize their interests 
with those of labor in a frame of strict justice."(1)
Within a year of having given the law of ICs the minister of Indus­
tries in a speech to a training group of industrial community workers 
said:
"Let me enumerate some of the principal and most im­
portant points:
1) All workers must fight together against underdevelop­
ment and poverty. The IC has ended the division be­
tween owners and non-owners.
2) In the modern world, enterprise that does not grow 
is enterprise that does not advance. The reinvestment 
in the company is the way to make sure our children 
will have enough. Any sacrifice we do today will be 
paid back in the future.
3) The function of the worker representative on the 
company board is to assure the best performance of 
the enterprise, so that there be more profits to 
share; his function is also to see that profits be
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distributed according to the law.
4) The IC must be a model of honesty and democracy...
5) The activities between the unions and the IC must 
be kept totally and clearly separated. Each one has 
a different area of competence.
’comuneros*  let us not let that left-wing or 
right-wing extremists import foreign problems and 
foreign solutions to our reality. Let us go back 
into our own communitarian traditions to find our 
own solutions to come out successfully from under­
development. Let us use Peruvian methods, Peruvian 
ideas and the labor and effort of all Peruvians."(2)
With respect to the value of work President Velasco said:
...in the final analysis, the basic source of wealth 
is work; therefore the economic wealth created be­
longs to both elements of production.(3)
Similarly General Leonidas Rodriguez, Director of SINAMOS, explains:
The principal factor of production is work and not 
capital. It is man with his creative potentials, with 
his intellectual activity, and with his manual dexter­
ity that is the source of wealth. Therefore man as 
the main creator of production must participate direct­
ly in everything that results from his labor. He must 
participate in the profits, in the ownership, and in 
the management of the enterprise.(4)
It is important to note that all along labor is considered as the 
basic source of wealth but not the only one. Labor, therefore, is entitled 
to ownership and that is the figure of the IC. The Minister of Industries 
says:
The IC...establishes that workers own the enterprise 
because they work in it and not because they are con­
tributing money. This change that reforms traditional, 
private enterprise is conducive to real worker partici­
pation in management, profits and ownership of the 
enterprise.(5)
Actually the workers own the enterprise because they both work and 
invest in it, but to be working in the enterprise is a condition "sine
qua non." There is a change in the concept of private property; a person
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is entitled to property with which he is working.
In the text of the law the high expectations for the IC are spelled 
out: "it will serve to strengthen private enterprise, increase productiv­
ity and develop industry in general."(6) Velasco believes that it will 
"be favorable to both entrepreneurs and workers as members of the same 
company."(6a) That as the company grows the more will worker and capital­
ist share in the profits is the idea of the Minister of Industries; (it 
can be also interpreted as meaning that besides the 15% allotted to the 
workers to increase their patrimony, the capitalists must also invest to 
stretch out the time period when the workers will own 50% of the capital.) 
But Jimenez also says:
...the effective participation of workers in the owner­
ship, management and profits of the enterprise must be 
a real contribution to the increase in productivity.(8) 
The worker must know what he is doing, why he is doing 
it and feel it his own; this is how he can achieve 
a greater productivity and this is one of the goals 
of the IC.(9)
As co-owners, their lack of discipline, low produc­
tivity, resistance to company innovation, attempts 
against the company, it therefore attempts against 
you. The company does not mean the same as it did 
before; it now belongs to the workers as well, and 
whatever is bad for the company is bad for the 
workers.(10)
On class antagonism
...the basis for the revolutionary change lies in 
overcoming the apparent antithesis between capital 
and labor.(11)
...(the IC) has not been created to harm the in­
terests of the entrepreneurs; on the contrary it 
has been created to harmonize them with those of 
the workers.(12) 
...Theories of class struggle, based on European 
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realities of a hundred years ago, are strong among 
our people. This is a sad example of mental colonial­
ism, a colonialism more detrimental than the political 
or economic one. The noble communitarian tradition 
we have received from the Incas has been blurred and 
displaced by a confrontation between owners and workers. 
This confrontation is absurdly consuming those energies 
that should be used to fight underdevelopment. To over 
come this objectable situation is that the IC has been 
created...(13)
In the IC model the figure of the worker as wage earner persists, but 
the government wants to deny it when it says: "The factory worker will not 
be a mere salary earner anymore"(14) "...there will not be a perpetuation 
of the exploitation the worker has been subject to."(15)
...the IC...represents a new and original model of 
organization destined to overcome a system that has 
at its heart the subordination of man to greed with­
out falling into a totalitarian dictatorship. This 
dictatorship in the end is not of the proletariat but 
of those who claim to represent it...The IC is an es­
sential element of the revolutionary, nationalistic, 
socialist and solidarian Peruvian model.(16)
A change of mentality is a fundamental factor for the successful 
achievement of the goals of the IC. "All this presupposes a period of in­
tense education in the field of labor relations."(17)
The Ministry of Industries has many booklets that are distributed
among workers for the purpose of educating them. In one of them we read:
This law is a real expression of the philosophy of the 
Revolution, IC and Humanism:
a) it recognizes the dignity of the human being.
b) it tends to transfer the social, economic, cultural 
and political power to the people through a gradual 
social democracy of full participation. This pre­
supposes a socio-economic structural change in order 
to attain a more just society. In this society no­
body would be subject to exploitation; that is, 
nobody would use a person as a mere instrument of 
work.
Expression of the Revolutionary Humanism:
1) Gradualism. It walks with firm steps in order to 
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create the new Peruvian man through planning and 
gradualism.
2) It is pluralistic. It accepts ideas, beliefs 
and forms of ownership provided that they do not go 
against the dignity of the human being.
3) It is not dogmatic. It is just a position, 
rational and critical, in order to understand the 
multiple problems that the revolution must solve. 
This position, rational and critical, becomes 
richer as the revolution moves towards a social 
democracy of full participation.
4) It is Libertarian. Its aim is to arrive at a 
true free society where each man makes his own 
destiny and serves his fellowmen through solidarian 
actions.
For all this reasons humanism is imcompatible 
with capitalism and with communism; it rejects the 
economic exploitation of capitalism and the ideologi­
cal and political manipulation of communism. It is 
exactly this situation of exploitation and abjection 
that the revolutionary government does not accept; 
its goal is to create a society where justice and 
freedom exist together.(21a)
On the Unions and the IC
The government does not say it, but it was believed that the IC was 
created as a mechanism to eliminate the unions. Here are their official 
speeches:
The activities of the IC and those of the unions must 
be kept clearly and totally separated; their activi­
ties belong to different areas.(18)
...our concept about the complementarity of the unions 
and the IC: Both institutions have mechanisms for 
worker participation and are therefore instruments 
for the construction of a new society.(19)
...the worker in the enterprise performs a double 
role. He has his individual rights as salary earner 
which he must defend through the union...he has the 
communitarian right to the ownership of the company 
and these rights he defends through the IC.(20)
...the relations of ownership and production will 
change so much that the workers will have to re­
define and reorient the role of the unions.(21)
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To complement the above here are some opinions gathered while 
interviewing the Chief of IC Organizations for the MIT (21b). "From the 
beginning there was a negative reaction from the unions. They thought 
we were trying to destroy them; but later they changed tactics and began 
taking over the leadership of the IC. They wanted to make a second union 
or a prolongation of one of the IC. This was when there had not been 
enough education about the IC among the workers. In the third stage, 
which is happening now, a new leadership is emerging, workers who know 
what the IC and the philosophy of the revolution are all about. The 
unions and the IC still work close together but they know now what the 
differences are. The communitarian conscience has gone beyond a vindic­
ative zeal to now work for the betterment of everybody. Managers are 
understanding this too...That lack of coersion in the law, I believe, was 
intentional. The law of IC was so radical that it had to be left open for 
political reason. The particular dynamics of the situation would dictate 
its sanctions. When the idea was publicized and implemented long enough 
and polarizations occurred, ...then it was time to regulate it (the law 
of IC). The "Fuero privativo" does that. The law of IC is an integral 
law now. The MIT does not have any direct and official business with 
the Fuero; although, it is under consideration having an administrative 
hearing of first instance at the Ministry and sending only those cases 
that cannot be settled here to the courts."
Later I interviewed the Chief Advisor to the Minister of Industries 
(21c) who said: "although the law remains the same there has been a re­
interpretation or a better understanding of what was meant by it. The 
law once promulgated has life of its own and the people reacting to it
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make for its evolution. There is still lack of coersion but with the
Fuero Privative (Legal) problems of the IC’s can be solved within (the 
framework of) civil and even criminal legislation; before we could only 
see them (Legal problems of the IC’s) as administrative problems. The 
Fuero*s  decisions are final."
2) Capital
As soon as the Law of Industries was promulgated the institutions 
representative of the industrialists expressed their opinions through the 
newspapers responsive to their interests. For example:
The National Society of Industries thinks that for 
the effective industrial development of the country, 
the role of the state must be that of promoter... the 
main function of the state must be oriented without 
delay to fundamental works of infrastructure: schools, 
urban development, hospital, roads, irrigations, 
etc.(22)
Then followed several pronouncements in which the industrialists 
seemed to support the idea of worker participation in profits. Of the 
participations called for in the law, the capitalist favored profit shar­
ing over sharing in the ownership.
The so called industrial community involves an 
experiment unknown to Latin America and to our 
juridical regime... (24)
We consider that the industrial community, 
established by law, constitutes an improvisation 
in order to put into practice a theoretical con­
cept that has not been implemented anywhere 
before... (25)
Five years later this same statement was repeated to me by the mana­
ger of the Chamber of Commerce in Arequipa: (26) "Unfortunately the law 
of IC was in fact improvised for political reasons and has created more 
conflicts than solutions to problems. While the IC is fundamental the 
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law has too many flaws. Interested parties from all sides have suggested 
changes to the government to correct deficiencies and fill in gaps in the 
law. But amendments to the law or additional laws would be even more con­
fusing. The old legislation should be repealed and a new law (with the 
benefit of five years experience be approved). We hope that our input will 
be taken into account."
He also added, "Once a company is 50% worker-owned it will be unman­
ageable. The workers*  representative is powerful, he takes part in all 
basic decision in the company. He is generally ignorant and opposes many 
proposals because he does not understand. Some items already settled are 
reopened because the workers*  representative says that he has consulted 
the issue with his council but later they do not agree. This obstructs 
the normal functioning of a company...Before the implementation of the law 
there should have been an intense educational process. Workers behave as 
if the IC were another union...before you give co-management there should 
be an understanding of what is to manage... The percentages (of profit 
distribution) are so high they will drive a company to stagnation. People 
are so unaware of all these mechanisms that if they had the choice they 
would choose to receive all profits in cash. There is a marked individ­
ualistic tendency. The workers do not feel owners and the managers and 
capitalists feel insecure...the worker lives day by day; his only interest 
is to earn more cash; he does not care if the IC owns 20% or 30%..."
"A formula has to be created where the need for justice and the stimu­
lation of the worker are harmonized. To be in a hierarchy seems to be 
part of our human condition... None of the seminars given to the workers 
have had the right orientation. They have not made the worker realize 
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that he is part owner of the enterprise, that he participates in the 
decisions. On the contrary there has been an open invitation to class
struggle. This is contrary to official policy."
The main ideas published in the newspapers pertain to the mistake of 
giving communal participation shares instead of individual shares, stock 
certificates of the company to the workers:
...the share the company would give to its workers 
should be given annually in private property, for 
ever and with the right to be inherited. In this 
way one of the goals of the law of industries would 
be fulfilled, that is to tend to ’the permanent 
socio-economic development of the country*  and at 
the same time it will protect the worker and his 
family in old age or in case of death...(27)
*the right to private property
They also thought that it would obstruct private investment:
...the IC... will mean an obstacle to investments and 
consequently to the development process of indus­
try. (28)
The uncertainty about the future of this right*,  
closely linked to human nature, will spread over all 
other sectors; as a consequence of this fear, invest­
ment in general will shrink, making more serious the 
situation of unemployment and underemployment, al­
ready critical, which is the cause of the present 
economic crisis.(29)
In a study (30) about the reaction of the right-wing or capitalists
to the law of industrial communities, Alberto Bustamante advances the 
thesis that the capitalists*  strategy was to ’win back*  or to make the
IC work for their purposes since the basic characteristics of the model
were in the implementation. For this reason he says that the indus­
trialist would emphasize those aspects more compatible with their ideo­
logy such as to demonstrate that the IC does not want class struggle but 
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harmony between capital and labor and the clear distinction between IC 
and unions.
In another interview with the general manager of the brewery in 
Arequipa (31) I was told that "The IC is a phenomenon of masses. In the 
IC all workers are obliged to come together and as any phenomenom of 
masses it tends to be captured by a political ideology, the same happens 
with the unions. The government has tried to manipulate the IC first 
through the Ministry of Industries and then through SINAMOS. This latter 
has been stronger and now the MIT and SINAMOS are fighting between them­
selves. What is sad about it is the childishness and immaturity of the 
arguments...the IC is part of the company since it gathers all workers, 
but it has been dominated by blue collar workers and the representation 
in the company’s board is limited to only those people. There is no equal 
distribution of positions and representation among all levels of work. 
This is a flaw in the law. ...Another problem is that all IC’s organ­
ize and try to solve the problems of one IC. They should let each IC 
solve its problems directly with its company. To me this is a form of 
totalitarianism, government pretends to rule the lives of people complete­
ly... the government is asking for the impossible, they (people in govern­
ment) say that they are not capitalists nor communists, what are they 
then? We are talking about private property, ownership of the means of 
production, so they have to belong to individuals or to the state. My 
opinion is that the government wants to destroy private activity. It is 
false that we are having economic pluralism, things have to be done one 
at a time. The military think that civilians are indisciplined people 
and the country can only run with their models. But it has not worked.
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The IC has not brought peace to labor, nor has it increased productivity 
except for those highly successful enterprises where workers realize they 
will get less if they stop working...If the IC and the union share the 
same ideology they work together; if not, they are antagonistic and fight 
each other. When the workers*  representative to the company’s board be­
gins to understand what it is to be on the board he is immediately dis­
qualified by the rest of the assembly; they tell him that he has sold his 
soul to management, that he has been captured, colonized. The man is 
desperate and loses his position. But generally the workers*  representa­
tive does not have any idea of what is going on at the board."
There have also been positive reactions from industrialists towards 
the law of IC as well. Samuel Drassinower, owner of a large enterprise, 
has even been the spokesman, together with members of government, in pub­
lic gatherings. Here are some of his ideas:
We do not want to stay behind in industry, we do 
not only want that 50% be worker owned and 50% 
still owned by the traditional capitalist... 
The government with the idea that the great 
changes the country needs are urgent, has come to 
add not to subtract, to multiply not to divide... 
it wants to propel by law the increase of invest­
ments. (31)
Our goal is to share the goods and fruits of pro­
duction with our fellow workers and with the people. 
(32) 
...social property. Perhaps this will be the channel 
to solve the unemployment problem that the forces 
which traditionally create jobs cannot solve. Why? 
Because there are not enough private enterprises to 
create the amount of jobs that are needed...The 
state cannot do it at this point either because it 
is working at coming out of the underdevelopment of 
the state, it is creating the basic industries that, 
as you know, are capital intensive and low in job 
creating. (33)
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If we create these new companies (social property) and 
add them to the state-owned and the private companies 
and find enough entrepreneurs, we shall produce more. 
(34)
3) Labor
The opinions of capital are fairly homogeneous, with a few noticeable 
exceptions; those of labor are less so because it is fragmented into di­
verse ideological groups. As soon as the Law of Industries was promul­
gated those parties who said they represented the workers’ pleas pub­
lished their opinions. The law has been attacked by the groups of the 
left from the beginning.
....in order to cushion the fight of the proletarian 
and attempt a conciliation of classes, the Junta 
has created the IC, telling us the story that we 
must not go on strikes because we will ’diminish 
the profits’. They also tried to trick us trying 
to make us believe that the workers will some day 
own 50Z of the enterprise. The emphasis they put 
in the IC is in order to neutralize the work of 
the unions.(34)
...the law signified...a conciliation between 
classes, it pretends to belittle the class strug­
gle and to chain the working class to bourgeois 
interests. From this point of view the law is 
detrimental to the revolutionary process.(35)
...the implied dilemma between the IC and the unions 
...comes as a factor that will obstruct the develop­
ment of the syndicalist and political movement of 
classes, obliging the proletariats to start a 
political fight among themselves.(36)
The IC besides feeding the illusion that the small 
bourgeoisie has planted in some workers...it is 
an instrument to create unemployment, low salaries 
and undermine the unions.(37)
...any form of worker participation in management 
has a reactionary content, it pulls apart the pro­
letarian from the object of his struggle: to 
eliminate the capitalistic system...the workers 
representatives...will have to try to save 
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capitalism.(38)
There is evidence in the leftists publications of the change in 
attitude towards the IC expressed by the government official I interviewed. 
After a first stage of opposition the leftists decide to make the IC work 
for their purposes, the same tactic as the capitalists.
Instead of numbing the class consciousness, the 
IC has developed it even more. It has made the 
worker aware of management and ownership of the 
enterprise and it has shown him the greedy nature 
of capitalism that would go to any extremes to 
make high profits.(39)
...This is an absolutely transitory measure to 
solve the needs of the working class and of develop­
ment. That is why the revolutionary proletariat must 
take it like all the other reforms: not as a goal but 
as a step towards the revolutionary change.(40)
These people do not believe in the IC as a solution but as a positive 
means to raise consciousness and make the worker an active participant in 
the process of class struggle.
A few years after the law was given IC’s all over the country began 
to organize with the help of the government. Those in the capital Lima 
got organized by type of industry (candy makers, bottle makers, etc.) and 
those in the provinces organized by geographic region. This organization 
was called CONACI (National Confederation of IC’s).(41) In 1973 the first 
national conference was held,a federation formed. By this time workers 
had been subject to education about IC’s not only from official sources 
(the MIT and SINAMOS) but also from many other sources. For example, I 
identified five different training courses, other than the two already 
mentioned, there were the courses given by the company itself, the ones 
organized by the unions and sometimes even courses organized by the IC 
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independently from the government. Each of these groups had a vested 
interest and a particular way of seeing reality; the interpretation they 
gave to the IC was therefore some times quite different. Nevertheless, 
at the national conference one group dominated and its pronouncements 
that became the official opinion of the IC workers was:
"The IC, as an instrument for democratic participation in the manage­
ment, capital and profits of private enterprise, must be defended and made 
stronger by all workers.
"The IC cannot be seen as a gift from the capitalists nor as a means 
for false harmony while the exploitation of men by men persists.
"Workers are the only owners of the capital of the enterprises and 
the creation of the IC is a public recognition that this is so.
"The IC represents the meeting place of all levels of management with 
common interests. We all want to fight together as creators of wealth 
and as proletariats.
"The IC has not changed the exploitative economic system. It has 
created even more conflict within the enterprises.
"Co-management is more theoreotical than real. Representation on the 
company’s board is weak and non-existent at the intermediate levels of 
administration. The vertical, hierarchical, capitalist structure is still 
maintained. We want an active participation in the everyday life of 
the enterprise.
"The 10% profit sharing is too little, the capitalists without any 
effort take away 73%.*
"It is necessary to create a tribunal to settle the differences be­
tween the IC and the capitalists.*
*These items will be treated in the next chapter.
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"The IC is real and effectively interested in promoting and increas­
ing production so that all workers would have a better standard of living.
"Unions are indispensable tools in defense of labor stability, sala­
ries and labor conditions. The IC and the unions should work together 
for the good of all workers and of the country.
"The members of the IC, as part of the Peruvian population, cannot 
forget the unemployment problem of the country, the poverty, the cultural 
and health deprivation of our brothers who are suffering because imperial­
istic enterprises take away all our wealth. For this reason we want to 
become involved and work together in defense of the interests of the people.
"The 10% profit sharing should be distributed equally to every worker 
and not 50% of it in equal shares and 50% according to salary.*" (42)
Following are some opinions of an ex-chairman of the workers council 
of a highly successful company:
The IC should be a success like in many European 
countries. You do not need to be socialistic in 
order to have workers*  participation. But we are 
a long way off yet, because of the ignorance of the 
workers. They do not understand nor interpret the 
law right...the training that sometimes is given by 
the government is manipulative, specially SINAMOS. 
The Ministry of Industries training is better but 
when they give their course they do not ask how 
much do you know, they give courses that sometimes 
are too simple or too advanced. They do not know 
if the workers have university education or are 
illiterates...the results so far are positive for 
the large enterprise, the workers have learned 
that producing more for their enterprise they bet­
ter themselves on the way...Our activities are 
completely separated from those of the union...in 
small enterprises the IC does not work as well, 
in some it does not even exist. There are so many 
industries that the MIT does not know they are 
there and the workers do not know how to start 
an IC...the law of IC is not very good, it has 
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gaps that have created conflict, the "fuero privativo" 
takes care of it now. We have not had any problems 
so far. Many of the problems are no fault of manage­
ment, it is fault of the law...the worker elected to 
the company's board needs to learn the language of 
management and even then he will never be able to 
know as much as the other members of the board who 
have many other community supporting institutions like 
the Chamber of Commerce, the Society of Industries, 
to assist them. We can hire experts to assist us but 
it costs money..the IC is based on profits, if there 
are no profits there is nothing. Those IC’s that have 
not had profits do not share in anything. The deci­
sion making power is very limited. The most im­
portant decisions are not made at the board but in 
the administration. When the worker representative 
wants to intervene in those areas, he generally is 
not heard, because that is not specified in the law.(43)
For contrast the opinions of the president of the workers' union of 
another highly successful enterprise where the IC exists only on paper and 
meetings are not held because the manager-owner of the company has a way 
of avoiding them.
In our case the union is the strong one, the one that 
pressures for improvements for the workers. The IC 
does not do anything, it exists only on paper. The 
general assemblies are recorded in the books to ful­
fill the requirements but we do not meet. We would 
like to get organized in an IC but everytime we elect 
a council it gets co-opted by management and they do 
not do anything. Management avoids setting up dates 
like when it has to report on the balance sheet and 
the net profit. We do not know what the state of the 
company is. The manager says we own so much of the 
stockholders equity, in the books, but we have not 
shared any yet...If the IC worked as it should there 
would not be need for a union, the IC through co­
management would solve all the workers’ problems. It 
would also have access to the company's books. We as 
a union do not and the accountant is not even a mem­
ber of the IC, he does not work full time and must 
be paid well to keep quiet. The law is good but it 
does not work because the capitalists are very 
tricky.(44)
To finalize this section here are the opinions of the president of 
the regional federation of union workers (communist ideology):
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...the worker was not prepared to take the opportunity 
presented to him be the IC. The majority of workers 
do not know anything about accounting or management. 
When employees who know are elected they do not respond 
to the workers needs but to those of management. The 
worker is interested in the net profit and when there 
are no profits he blames it on the worker representative. 
Now the worker is more interested in learning management 
and accounting, he is aware of the economic crisis and 
he worries, he wants to be prepared. So far the 
manager takes advantate of his ignorance and blames on 
him everything that goes wrong...we as unionists think 
that the law of IC is good and revolutionary, that is 
why we want it to work. We understand that we need to 
learn, all we ask is that training be available. We 
need technicians. The universities should teach us. 
We are against the university students that shout 
revolution to everyone and everything and in practice 
are our enemies. When they graduate they go to serve 
the entrepreneurs against us. Those students go to 
school with our money, we support them. The money the 
state gives the universities comes from the people. 
That is why the universities should give training to 
the workers in a permanent basis, not short seminars, 
you do not learn anything in three or four days... the 
union supports the IC, we go on strike together when 
the IC is not treated right. The ’comuneros’ are also 
union members.(45)
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CHAPTER VII
Conflicts and Their Solutions. (A Dialectical Analysis)
At this point we already know who the three main actors are and how 
they understand and interpret the law of IC. Let us see now some import­
ant moments in the evolution of the implementation of the law. 
How the Law of IC Caused Conflicts
Using the records of MIT, Jorge Santistevan performed an analysis of 
the problems which came to the attention of the Ministry during the first 
two years after the law was promulgated. Below I have summarized some of 
the more relevant problems.
It must be noted that this evaluation is incomplete since not all 
problems were reported or recorded. It is interesting to note that com­
panies with greater than 20 workers reported more problems than those with 
less than 20, (the number necessary to qualify for organizing a union.(2) 
Companies with large numbers of workers have a long history of class strug­
gle and awareness as to their rights; for this reason minor faults in the 
implementation of the law or minor misinterpresations caused great dif­
ficulties.
a) What companies qualified to have IC? There was conflict when the com­
pany was engaged in more than one activity. For it was not clear how many IC’s 
should there be ; and when the enterprise had service besides production, 
the question was should those workers in the service department be ex­
cluded from the IC? It needed to be defined who was full-time employed?
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What about those companies that are agricultural, should they have IC too? 
When these problems were taken to the MIT generally, Santistevan reports, 
the Ministry did not solve them. Those enterprises with strong unions 
pressed through their collective bargaining for the implementation of 
the law of IC. There were many splits and subdivisions inside companies 
so that only those involved in actual production would have an IC; this 
was especially notorious among small enterprises.
b) Access to the Company's Books. For strategic reasons, management was 
extremely reluctant to let outsiders know the details of the financial 
condition of the company and in many instances denied the worker repre­
sentative access to company books and records. The workers insistence on 
looking at the company's records sprung from the distrust about the ac­
curacy of financial statements; the workers did not believe there were no 
profits when so declared by the company. Profit sharing was questioned as 
well. In addition other problems of an accounting nature arose. Such as: 
How is overtime computed, vacations, leaves of absence?
On evaluating a company's shares, it created confusion as how to 
establish a value: Book value or market price? In every case the MIT ruled 
it was book value even when market price was sometimes higher and on one 
occasion lower than the book value. Sometimes the workers did not want to 
invest their 15% in the company but preferred to use that money to hire 
outside experts in order to control the company.
c) Co-Management. In many instances companies did not accept worker re­
presentatives on the boards nor at stockholder meetings. In other cases, 
worker representatives did not receive information ahead of time about 
the board's agenda and were completely lost at the meetings; sometimes the 
language used at the board was not Spanish. Many times the workers wanted 
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more active participation in management than just attendance at board 
meetings; at others they brought to the board problems that were strict­
ly labor or union related, and not appropriate to a board meeting.
Labor
The majority of conflicts reported by labor were related to the 10% 
profit sharing and the 15% distribution to the IC. The workers did not 
trust the financial statements made available to them and asked the MIT 
repeatedly to send an auditor.
Labor wanted to use the IC and the co-management power to serve 
vindictive purposes and it felt frustrated by the lack of intermediate 
channels of participation. They were more interested in the immediate 
and tangible aspects of participation, therefore their interest in knowing 
the exact figures; only exceptionally were they concerned with productiv­
ity or strengthening the enterprise.
The Capitalist
The greatest concern of the capitalists was the influence of the 
unions in the IC. The industrialists tried to find interpretations of the 
Law of IC and the Law for Mercantile Societies. The refusal to accept a 
worker representative on the board was often excused by the need to re­
solve a legal problem first.
In many cases the companies did not follow the recommendations of 
the MIT, considering them to be opinions without force of law. The most 
serious offenders of this nature were small companies.
Government
There is no law that authorizes the MIT to solve any difficulties 
created by the IC legislation. Nevertheless, a sui generis system was 
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invented in the MIT and which developed into an organization to control 
and see to the proper implementation of the law. Thus, the MIT began 
to function like a quasi-juridical organization (3) although it lacked 
the legal power of coersion. Usually; however, in those cases where both 
parties asked for the opinion of the MIT they followed its recommendations. 
Many decisions were the result of political pressure. Later many issues 
were settled by special decree-laws.(4) 
CONACI
Another important moment in the history of the implementation of the 
law of IC was a congress of IC’s held during the last week of February in 
1973. It was called by the workers themselves who since 1971 had been 
organizing, but it was also highly influenced by the government. One of 
the products of the national meeting was the formation of a permanent 
federation of IC’s, the National Federation of Industrial Communities or 
CONACI. (See Chapter VI.) SINAMOS and the Ministry of Industry played an 
active role in the congress and CONACI and even competed for leadership. 
Luis Pasara who was present as an advisor to the workers (5) reports that 
the congress was very politicized and the government attempted to mani­
pulate it; the workers however, managed to come through fairly independent­
ly. The communist party was also present through its members influencing 
the congress, but the ideology of the revolution, interpreted by the work­
ers according to their own perspective, won with their generalized al­
legiance. The main ideas of the national congress were presented in 
Chapter VI as the official interpretation of labor about IC. Those items 
worth commenting here had an asterisk. The items here of importance to 
us are: that they thought the private capitalist took all 73% of the net 
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profit after distributing 10% individually to each worker, 15% com­
munally to the IC to buy shares, and 2% for technological studies. That 
was a mistake; the company still had to pay 25% on taxes and if the IC 
was a partner it would receive the equivalent to its shares, perhaps up 
to 50% of the profit after taxes. The workers in this instance show 
clearly their union-oriented mind, they do not see themselves as capital­
ists as well, even though they are sharing of the capital.
At the Congress a special court was requested that would deal only 
with the problems of IC’s. In June 1975 the court was created. Although 
apparently the government responded to pressure from the workers to create 
it, there are contrary opinions. A general manager I interviewed (7) be­
lieves this petition was one of the manipulations of the government and 
that the idea was proposed by a workers’ leader in the pay of the govern­
ment, who said that it is what the workers wanted. My interviewee is of 
the opinion that the blueprint was too perfect to have been elaborated in 
such a short period of time. Before the congress nobody had ever mentioned 
a tribunal.
Another important issue that came out of the congress was the change 
in the distribution of the 10% net profit among all workers. Since 
December 1975 everybody who works full time shares equally, regardless of 
pay scale or longevity.
As a result of the first national congress a draft of a new law of 
IC was made public and interested sectors of the population began to dis­
cuss it. The draft contained many of the proposals presented by CONACI. 
The promulgation of a new law has not been done and according to government 
officials I interviewed such a law will never be promulgated. Instead a 
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new law that will reform all private enterprises, not only industrial, 
will be given; this new law will also replace the Law for Mercantile 
Societies of 1961.
Newspapers reporting on the congress had interesting insights:
...the creation of the national confederation of IC 
means the birth of a powerful political instrument, 
superior to the political parties and to the unions. 
This national organization, not foreseen in the law 
of IC, could eventually become a time bomb against 
the pluralistic, humanistic and libertarian revolu­
tionary process; it would try to accelerate its 
rhythm permanently.(8)
This prediction of evil did not happen; however, because government, 
according to Pasara (9) managed to split the organization almost from 
the beginning so it would not develop independently. Both branches 
pleaded allegiance to the revolution and tried to gain official recogni­
tion. Eventually, in 1974, the two groups reunited. The public policy 
of the reunited organization was inssupport of the ideology of the revolu­
tion and of syndicalist socialization. CONACI, as the federation is 
called, was present whenever there were public meetings in support of 
government policies. They also published pronouncements in newspapers in 
support of the revolution and of the workers pleas. Here is one of them 
on the occasion of a strike by the Central Union of Private Employees:
...many enterpreneurs, stubborn in their anti­
revolutionary goals, try to ignore the fundamental 
role of labor in building of the new society.(10)
In February 1976 CONACI, reunited, held a meeting of the national 
board to organize the second national congrpsg. The date was set for 
September but later postponed indefinitely due to political instability 
of the country.
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Law for Small Enterprises.
If CONACI can be considered the pressure group of organized labor,
the Society of Industries and the Chamber of Commerce are the organized
pressure groups of capital. Their pronouncements, mixed with complaints that 
they are not heard by government, but especially their non-action (e.g.
refusing to reinvest), influenced many changes in the IC as well.
It is a fact that by the end of the second year Peruvian industry
had grown because of forced internal reinvestment and by 1973 the IC did
30% of all investment in the private industry (10a) and without new
foreign capital.(11) Fitzgerald says that the local bourgeoisie became 
disillusioned and indifferent. Drassinower, who advocates the government 
changes, explains it this way:
The entrepeneurial activity in Peru is moving at 
an inadequate rhythm, and this is not because of the 
IC...
(one reason) when the IC reaches the 50% the chair­
man of the board will be decided by luck, we can­
not depend on chance to run a company...The solution 
is when there is equal capital sharing in a company, 
the technical management, those who are prepared, 
should have the decisive vote...
(another reason)...you cannot have continual obliga­
tory reinvestment every year; that runs new capital 
away, and that is what the law of industries calls 
for. A company that does not pay adequate dividends 
cannot call on the capital market.(12)
The Law of Small Enterprises (13) of February 24, 1976, is considered
a victory for the forces of capital by those integrating labor. Capital, 
however, is not so sure. In abstract the law will reduce the number of
IC's to only those companies with an annual gross profit of more than
25 million soles (13), in the industrial sector. The percentages for pro­
fit sharing are different according to the type of activity. In small 
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companies not qualifying for an IC, and therefore without co-ownership 
and co-management, workers will receive 25% of the pretax net profit
divided equally. This seemed to be the solution proposed by the capital­
ists all along in its pronouncements; however, when I interviewed a
general manager (13) he told me that even without IC the workers will
have a lot of control. When they are given their profit sharing they will 
question the financial statements and demand to know the details of com­
pany operations. They still will have their union and with their experi­
ence on IC affairs they will ask to take active part in the company’s 
management or threaten to go on strike. It is still too soon to know if 
this prediction will be fulfilled.
As we have said labor does not look upon the law favorably:
The law of small enterprise (without IC) and its 
reaffirmation that it will not be modified, is a 
first step towards asking that the IC be phased 
out from the companies that still have it but 
because of its economic size could be included 
in the small enterprise model...the right...a 
good part of their demands have been picked up 
in the law of small enterprises...(the government) 
is preparing the ground for a destruction of the 
IC, it is playing with the idea of a law for the 
entire private sector to fit the demands (of the 
right).(14)
In an important message to the nation, President Morales Bermudez (15) 
insisted once again on the economic pluralism of the revolution giving 
equal time and emphasis to each of the four sectors. In previous occasions 
the social property sector had been called prioritary and hegemonic. When 
Velasco was president he asserted the transcendental importance of the 
social property sector,"expresses in the economy the Revolution's funda­
mental political option’’(16). Indeed he claimed the creation of the social 
property sector was "perhaps the most important step of the Revolution"(17).
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But not so anymore under the rule of President Morales. However, in 
March 1976 Morales still listed the socialist ideal among the goals of 
the Revolution (18).
Latest Developments
Since President Morales Bermudez replaced President Velasco there 
has been an open and systematic turn towards the middle of the road. The 
radical reforms have been tempered. There is a feeling of confidence 
among the capitalists and of anxiety among the radical left. The union 
workers interviewed have decided to oppose the government now because 
they believe it is betraying their cause (19). The representatives of 
capital are still vocal:
The IC should have contributed to strengthen the 
social peace promoting a feeling of harmony between 
capital and labor... In 1971 we had 377 strikes, in 
1972, 396; in 1973, 786; in 1974, 800 and in 1975, 
794. This means that between 1971, the year the IC 
began to function and 1975 strikes have increased 
by 100%... Another of the goals of the IC is to raise 
the standard of living of all workers by the distri­
bution of company's profits. The 10% profit sharing 
cannot be considered a victory for the IC, it already 
existed since 1950. The 15% communitarian sharing 
is irrelevant, the worker hardly gets any...it causes 
an unjust difference between the members of highly 
profitable companies and those who do not make any 
or even have losses. This caused an uneven distribu­
tion of incomes that was precisely what the IC was 
supposed to eliminate... The IC has not solved the 
unemployment problem it has made it worse...it has meant 
and still means a halt to investments and therefore to 
the creation of new jobs. Only 35% of the population 
economically active is fully employed and if we con­
sidered that our population growth is 3.1% a year the 
problem of unemployment is terrifying for the future... 
In the national development plan we read that industry 
is expected to grow 12.4% yearly between 1971-75. 
Unfortunately...in 1974 it was only of 8% and in 1975 
of 6%...certainly the IC is not the only factor deter­
mining this situation, but it has been and continues 
to be one of its most important causes...
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The IC has stopped the growth of small companies 
which did not want to reach the limits where they 
would have to have an IC...the IC therefore has 
not fulfilled its goal of strengthening the enter­
prise. .. 
Participation in management, ownership and profits 
has not increased production... In general terms 
there has not been growth and in many cases it 
has diminished...the IC does not constitute a real 
incentive to the worker who prefers immediate and 
direct remuneration through union action.(20)
After exposing all the ill consequences of the reform of the private 
sector by the IC, Dr. Simons presented a number of changes to make this 
model work; among them was, as labor had been fearing, the annulment of 
article 29 in the law of small enterprises (21) that asked that those 
companies already with IC would continue to function with it even if their 
income was below the amount set for the small enterprise. Dr. Simons con­
sidered it unfair to have two different applications of law within the 
same sector, creating an uneven situation between those small companies 
formed before and after the promulgation of the Law of Small Enterprise.
On July 28, 1976 President Morales Bermudez in his message to the 
Nation said;
In public enterprise the state is the manager and 
creator of capital, in the social property sector 
the worker is the manager and the creator of capital; 
likewise the private reformed sector is the result 
of private savings and of work. After five years of 
experience with the IC we see the need for studying 
its mechanism of participation in management and in 
profits.
The legislation on the Reformed Private Enter­
prise as it stands today does not insure stability 
in management to the private investor nor decision 
power to the worker in relation to the patrimony 
that he gets. The essence of the IC has been mis­
interpreted by the entrepreneur and by the worker 
and it has not been adequately regulated either... 
in many cases it has been an obstacle to its own 
ends...it has been a tool used by a few to manipulate...
Ill
It is necessary to readjust its mechanisms... 
without losing sight of its goals: to humanize and 
make more productive private enterprise...(22)
This pronouncement by the President was the final blow to the left­
wing orientation of the Peruvian government. In this speech a President 
for the first time since 1968 did not mention the word 'socialism*.
In World Perspective
Going back a few chapters we have seen that in 1968 when the Military 
overturned President Belaunde the country was in a great economic crisis.
In order to refinance its debts the Peruvian government had to borrow 
money from unusual sources at very high rates of interest (23). The World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other sources with reasonable in­
terest rates had been influenced by the United States who did not approve 
of Peru’s social revolution. The debt had been refinanced once before
but in 1975 the economic state of the country was so bad that no bank would
lend any money to Peru. Then we read in the New York Times (24)
The Peruvian Government, in power since 1968 as a 
revolutionary experiment, appears to be coming 
apart. The government is under pressure from a 
consortium of United States private banks that 
are making strict economic and political demands 
in exchange for loans to cope with huge foreign 
debts. As the fortunes of the leftist military 
regime have declined, its dependence on Western 
financial institutions has become increasingly 
clear.(24)
This article in the New York Times was published after the President’s 
address and shows a correlation and a reason for the back tracking on 
socialist reforms. Later on the loans were confirmed and the gradual phas­
ing out of self-management in the Peruvian infrastructure also began to be 
implemented. As of this writing there have not been any more changes in 
the IC model but more are expected to come any minute.
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The new law that will reform private enterprise, industrial as much as 
conimerical and of services, is being discussed at the Ministers level. 
In June 1976 the Minister of Industries gave an interview to the 
Brazilian newspaper "0 Estado de Sao Paulo” and in which he declared: 
...we are preparing the draft of a law to regulate 
the entire private sector and to replace the old law 
for mercantile societies. We shall give a new struc­
ture to private enterprise...it will have everything 
that works well from the IC...there will be a fund 
to finance those IC that because of lack of profits 
cannot buy shares into their enterprises... this 
will be the compensation fund... This is still under 
study...the IC’s that make better profits will help 
those who do not.(25)
I was offered a brief glimpse of the new law at the MIT but later I 
obtained a copy through an American oil company doing business in Peru.
One more example of the trend back to dependency. The foreign investor 
is given the first chance to discuss the benefits of the law before the 
Peruvian people are even aware of it. Since this law has not been 
promulgated there is still the possibility it might be changed again, 
depending on the power of the groups involved.
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CONCLUSIONS
1. The Military Government.
The people integrating the military government as we have seen in 
Chapter IV belonged to the middle class; their ideal, therefore, was to 
make everybody middle class people. Their values and aspirations were 
those of the small bourgeoisie, which is what they taught as their 
ideology of the revolution. They never departed from the capitalistic 
system although they tried to introduce some changes to make capitalists 
of every worker. Their speeches were unsubstantiated by their actions. 
On the one hand they talked about equality, humanity, social justice, de­
centralization while in practice they tried to perpetuate the capitalistic 
system where the amount of money possessed determined who held the power of 
decision in the enterprises. During the process, however, we can see changes 
in the military mentality due to the groups' pressures. On the one hand 
the government came to accept the imporatnce of the unions as complementary 
organizations to the industrial communities and on the other hand the 
government yielded toward the investors granting them more autonomy. Both 
changes emphasize the capitalistic structure being implemented. The dis­
function here is the incongruency between theory and practice. The system 
they tried to implement did not give real power to the worker, whose co­
management was diluted and hierarchisized. The average worker did not have 
a say about his everyday activity where he knew his task, but he was given 
power at the company’s board of directors for which he was not prepared. 
The worker never had a chance to succeed in the co-management model be-
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cause he was not prepared for what was asked of him.
In the pluralistic context of the economy we can see that the in­
dustrial community in the reformed private sector is halfway between the 
small private company, where all the capital belongs to the investor, and 
social property, where all the capital belongs to the workers. The social 
property sector did not exist in Peru until 1974 and I see its creation 
as a consequence of the dynamics of the co-management model started with 
the IC. When the workers learned what it was to manage an enterprise and 
where they fitted in the entire scheme they demanded that all private enter­
prise be given to them. They could not accept halfway measures. In the 
evolution of the ideology of the Revolution we can also see that self­
management at all levels of activity is in accordance with a social democracy 
of full participation. That is why at the beginning of this thesis I stated 
that the success of the IC was fundamental to changing the infrastructure of 
property. This change, however, proved to be not radical enough to attain 
the social democracy of full participation the government wanted, but it is 
like a splinter in the capitalistic system. It has been bothering both 
groups; the workers who now want all the company and the capitalists who 
do not want to share any, on the contrary they advocate a return to the 
status quo ante.
The government is definitely changing the interpretation of the 
ideology of the Revolution. It is not an ideology of self-management any­
more. The work "prioritary" still attached to the social property means 
now prioritary "to cover the social needs to create new jobs." President 
Morales Bermudez in his speech of November 20, 1976 (1) says that the 
people ask for jobs and where the private investors cannot provide them the 
117
state will furnish them through social property investments. Social pro­
perty (self-management) is seen now as the last resource to solve the 
unemployment problem of the country and not as the philosophy behind the 
new structural change.
Capital.
We have seen that the investors became disillusioned and were very 
vocal about their loss of management power. This situation was specially 
evident in their non-action: they stopped making new investments. This 
situation should not be surprising since it responds to previous sociali­
zation. The manager is trained to take all the risk and resents any in­
tervention. There were also those managers who changed their attitude and 
joined with the ideology of the revolution, in self defense or because 
they believed in their capacity as managers. This de facto situation and 
the power of the state made for many compliances. There were also the 
many loop holes in the law that still could be used to drain the net pro­
fits and not to have to share so much with the workers. Although the re­
form of the enterprise with the industrial community still responds to the 
capitalistic model those original owners of the capital resented having to 
yield part of their private property to the workers; this made for the 
disfunction of continuous opposition that obstructed the smooth running 
of the industries. In this situation the conclusions from the point of view 
of the investor are as follows: (2) By its nature the Law of Industrial 
Communities imposes limits to private property (or at least that property 
represented by investment in a company) in that it redefines management 
control and distribution of profits. These limits are important as well 
as of intellectual interest in that they set precedents in Peru for any 
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future national debate about private enterprise in other areas such as in 
agriculture or construction and about personal property rights regarding 
things such as homes, rental income from real estate, investment income 
from government bonds or even large personal savings accounts.
The limits imposed by the Law of IC are two:
1) Reduction in investment income by requiring a profit distribution.
2) Restriction of management control by imposing worker co-management.
Basically, it seems to me that several effects could have been anti­
cipated.
1. Passive investors, that is, investors who invest strictly for dividends 
as a means of obtaining a return on investment, would tend to withdraw 
their investment in companies with IC because of the reduction in profits 
available for dividend distribution and because of the uncertainty as­
sociated with influential and even dominant worker representatives in­
volved in management whose primary interest is job and salary security as 
opposed to return on investment. Furthermore, there are grave doubts as
to the qualifications of the worker representatives. I would expect a 
decrease of investor interest in companies with IC and an increase of capi­
tal investment in debt instruments of all types. Government bonds and non­
job creating activities such as real estate speculation. It should be 
remembered that in Peru many passive investors are people of modest means 
from Peru’s middle class.
2. Manager-owners would tend to withdraw their investment from their 
companies and act in the same fashion as passive investors, becoming em­
ployees without the same drive and ambition as before.
Severely reduced the number of entrepreneurs limiting new company and 
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job formation. Perhaps, incentives other than money and management free­
dom can be used to motivate entrepreneurs.
3. Labor leaders, union or non-union, have primary interest in job 
security and pay and thus would tend to promote these as opposed to other 
interests. Investment in technology or modernization would tend to be 
seen as a threat or potential threat to job security and therefore can be 
expected to decrease as worker representation increases. When the worker 
leaders better understand the function of work and intelligence in the 
production of wealth, then they will perform a more creative role in man­
agement versus the adversary one they now play.
Labor.
Since the moment the peasant became a proletariat his class con­
sciousness has been present and all his orientation in the working situ­
ation has been toward class struggle and confrontation with capital. All 
the teaching of the revolution about harmonizing capital and labor with 
the industrial community did not bloom because of the previous and con­
tinued union oriented mentality of the worker. The conclusion of the 
first national congress of industrial communities (CONACI) are an example 
of the still ciassist and vindicative mentality of the workers. There is 
however a change of mentality towards the ideology of the revolution in 
those industrial communities that are highly profitable where the worker sees 
the product of his work in cash. This situation is not new; it shows 
once again the capitalistic and individualistic orientation of the 
reformed private sector. In those enterprises highly profitable also the 
obligatory reinvestment makes them grow even more, making for concentration 
of capital in the same kind of activity instead of diversifying into other 
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more needed sectors. It also makes for capital intensive enterprises for 
two reasons: One is that if they have more cash it is logical they will 
invest in better technology and machinery; and second, those who are 
sharing in the profits will favor more money to share among a few than the 
hiring of more workers with whom they will have to share the pie.
As the workers become socialized to the ideology of the revolution in 
the highly profitable enterprises they stand out as an elite of workers. 
While in those IC’s where there is poverty and lack of profit there is 
still struggle and the syndicalist mentality is strong.
The economic and political goal of "harmonizing capital and labor" 
and "strengthening the enterprise" (3) has remained wishful thinking. In 
all companies without a union the IC has created one even before the com­
munity started functioning and the number of strikes has soared since that 
time. The workers consider the IC a buffer to their rightful pleas for 
better working conditions.
Recent studies however, (4) show that conflict in the highly profit­
able industries is diminishing and a conciliation of classes, as the govern­
ment expected, is beginning to be a reality. The nature of conflict is 
changing, not dis appearing. The IC of those successful enterprises is 
interested now in profiting for themselves disregarding the interests of 
the working class. They will oppose any conflict created by the unions 
in other companies which'would jeopardize their successful advancement.
This corroborates the idea that there is in formation an elite of IC workers 
in the successful companies.
On the other hand the IC has opened the inner functioning of the com­
pany to the workers and has made them aware of how capitalism works. This 
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is what they have been doing through their official organization CONACI 
which is indistinct from any classic vindicative union. The IC has given 
the workers new and unknown to the present, tools to fight capitalism.
It has also raised their class consciousness. There is a new kind of 
class struggle now started by the IC.
The unfulfilled raised expectations have created also a new kind of 
alienation and disillusionment which is as strong among poor workers as it 
is among impoverishing capitalists.
It was believed that the original idea for creating the IC was to 
eliminate the labor unions. If the IC had been implemented totally, if 
co-management had been given effective channels of participation, the 
unions would have lost their raison d’etre but while the workers still felt 
subject to the power of money, they needed their institution for collec­
tive bargaining to get their rights granted.
The IC is a house divided within itself. There is a very delicate 
balance the worker would have to attain in order to make the right deci­
sions in his double role as capitalist and as salary or wage earner. If 
the worker representative at the company’s board of directors makes deci­
sions to increase profits he would be going against his own interests as 
worker. If on the other hand he demands better working conditions, salary 
and rest periods he will be going against his interest as capitalist, and 
profits will be diminished.
There is a balance point where profits and working conditions can be 
maximized. To get there we need skilled management with a charismatic per­
sonality and responsiveness to the workers pleas.
To be in accordance with the ideology of the Revolution industry should 
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be part of the Social Property sector, that is, become self-managed. The 
implementation of such a model is what is unrealistic for Peru at this 
point. The educational level of the worker needs to be raised first.
There is a soaring need for managers at all levels. A self-managed econ­
omy would have to be led by managers of a special kind. They would have 
to be leaders, entrepreneurs, administrators and strategists (5), totally 
committed to the workers*  well-being. In the ideal type the role of the 
manager is mainly educational. The component of directing and motivating 
is larger than the component of disciplining and controlling. From self­
management stems self-control and self-discipline.
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THE ELECTION OF CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD WHEN THE I.C. OWNS 50%
ALTERNATIVE ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
a) To draw lots - It is simpler
- You do not have to change the 
law.
- The chairman will be related 
to the enterprise.
- The business policy is bound 
to change every year
-It will aid to increasing 
conflict
b) To draw lots the first 
year and to alternate 
from thereon.
- It is simple.
- You do not have to change the 
law.
- The chairman will be related 
to the enterprise.
- The business policy is bound 
to change every year
c) The position is 
designated by the "Fuero 
de Comunidades Laborales".
- Makes sure that a capable per­
son is named chairman.
- It is impartial.
- It reconciles conflicting 
interests.
- The decision is made by some­
body strange to the business
-It may take a long time
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TABLE - B
CO-MANAGEMENT AT VARIOUS LEVELS
ALTERNATIVES ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
a) The IC participates in the 
company’s board and in the 
shareholders meetings
- Law remains as it is.
- The incentives to inves­
tors remain the same.
- Limited participation
- Workers do not participate 
in the everyday decision 
making process.
b) Co-management advisors at 
all levels from the general 
managers to the working units
- Workers participate much 
more
- Workers learn what is going 
on in the enterprise.
- These advisory committees 
do not make decision.
- Investors probably will 
lose their incentives.
- It could be misinterpret­
ed leading to more con­
flict
c) Advisory committee at the 
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